THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


THE 
RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

BY 

ALEXANDER  PETRUNKEMTCH 

SAMUEL  NORTHRUP  HARPER 

FRANK  ALFRED  COLDER 

THE 
JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

BY 

ROBERT  JOSEPH  KERNER 


CAMBRIDGE 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY  MILFOED 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  FBES8 

1918 


COPYRIGHT,  1918 
HABVAED  UXrV'EESITT  PHESS 


PREFACE 

WHATE\^R  may  be  its  final  outcome  the 
Russian  Revolution  of  1917  bids  fair  to  re- 
main one  of  the  great  events  of  modern  history.  Its 
consequences  are  still  immeasurable  and  today  to 
many  they  appear  as  fraught  with  menace  as  with 
hope.  They  have  within  less  than  a  year  led  a 
mighty  empire  to  the  brink  of  dissolution  and  no 
man  can  foretell  where  and  how  the  process  will  end 
for  worse  or  for  better.  The  Russian  Revolution 
saved  the  Central  Powers  at  the  moment  when 
their  prospect  looked  darkest,  but  on  the  other 
hand  it  facilitated  the  entrance  of  the  United  States 
into  the  war  as  one  for  liberty  and  democracy. 
Time  has  yet  to  show  whether  the  loss  or  the  gain 
has  been  the  greater  for  the  Allied  cause  and  for 
mankind.  It  will  be  paid  for  at  a  heavy  price  but 
our  hope  cannot  easily  be  shaken  that  sooner  or 
later  an  event  so  full  of  promise  for  the  misruled 
millions  of  the  autocratic  empire  of  the  Tsar  will 
mark  a  step  forward,  not  backward,  in  the  progress 
of  the  world.  The  whole  story  of  the  sudden  out- 
break in  Petrograd  which  in  little  more  than  a 
day  swept  away  the  fabric  of  imperial  govern- 
ment will  not  soon  be  told,  if  ever.  All  real  infor- 
mation on  the  subject  is  timely  and  valuable.  We 
need  such  studies  as  those  contained  in  the  present 


^  '^r~*^.-fi  M-j^-v 


iv  PREFACE 

volume,  in  order  that  we  may  understand  what  has 
happened,  and  why  it  has  happened. 

The  rise  of  the  modern  Jugo-Slav  movement 
offers  us  a  very  different  picture.  The  subject  and 
even  the  name  are  new  to  most  people,  the  scale  is 
much  smaller;  the  events  have  been  less  dramatic. 
But  the  unconquerable  resistance  which  a  small 
disjointed  nationality  has  offered  throughout  the 
ages  to  ill  fortune,  oppression,  and  to  attempts 
to  obliterate  it  entirely  arouses  our  admiration. 
The  movement  too  was  intimately  connected  with 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  world  war  which  can- 
not be  understood  without  taking  it  into  account. 
It  still  represents  only  an  ardent  hope  for  the  future 
but  when  the  day  of  peace  and  justice  comes  no 
permanent  allotment  can  be  made  of  the  lands  east 
of  the  Adriatic  that  shall  not  give  it  at  least  some 
satisfaction. 

Archibald  Gary  Coolidge. 

Maech  18,  1918. 


THE  ROLE  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

IN  THE  LIBERATING  MOVEMENT 

IN  RUSSIA 


THE  ROLE  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

IN  THE  LIBERATING  MOVEMENT 

IN  RUSSIA 

By  ALEXANDER  PETRUNKEVITCH 

IN  an  interview  dated  November  21,  and  pub- 
lished in  the  New  York  Times  in  a  special 
cable  from  Petrograd,  Leon  Trotzky  in  defending 
the  attitude  of  the  people  toward  the  Bolsheviki 
cowp  d'etat  is  reported  to  have  said  substantially 
the  following:  "  All  the  bourgeoisie  is  against  us. 
The  greater  part  of  the  intellectuals  is  against  us 
or  hesitating,  awaiting  a  final  outcome.  The  work- 
ing class  is  wholly  with  us.  The  army  is  with  us. 
The  peasants,  with  the  exception  of  exploiters,  are 
with  us.  The  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  govern- 
ment is  a  government  of  workingmen,  soldiers,  and 
peasants  against  the  capitalists  and  landowners." 
On  the  other  hand  my  father,  Ivan  Petrunke- 
vitch,  floorleader  of  the  Constitutional  Democratic 
party  in  the  first  Duma  and  since  that  time  owner 
and  publisher  of  the  Petrograd  daily  Rech  writes 
in  a  private  letter  dated  June  12:  ".  .  .  the  pres- 
ent real  government,  i.  e.,  the  Council  of  Soldiers' 
and  Workmen's  Deputies,  whose  leaders  are 
neither  soldiers  nor  workmen,  but  intellectuals, 
etc." 


4  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

Nothing  has  happened  during  the  months  inter- 
vening between  the  letter  and  the  interview  to 
change  the  composition  of  the  Council  appreciably. 
It  is  true  that  Kerensky  who  was  vice-president 
of  the  Council  has  been  meanwhile  deposed;   that 
Tshcheidze  had  to  relinquish  the  presidency  in  the 
Council  to  Trotzky  long  before  Kerensky's  down- 
fall;  but  the  leaders  of  the  Council  still  are  intel- 
lectuals, are  well  educated  men,  some  of  them  well 
known  writers  on  political  and  economic  questions 
and  withal  very  different  from  the  masses  which 
they  lead  and  which  they  purport  to  represent. 
In  justice  to  those  who  had  to  give  way  to  the 
Lenine-Trotzky  crowd  of  supporters,  I  wish  to 
state  emphatically  that  I  do  not  want  to  put  them 
on  the  same  plane.    Tseretelli,  Plekhanov,  Tshche- 
idze, and  their  co-workers  are  men  of  great  courage, 
high  ideals,  and  personal  integrity.    On  the  other 
hand  their  successors  in  power  are  men  of  a  totally 
different  type.     The  integrity  of  many  of  their 
number  has  been  openly  questioned,  the  accusa- 
tions published  broadcast  remained  unanswered, 
and  no  suit  for  libel  was  brought  by  the  men  thus 
accused.    Lenine  was  put  under  suspicion  of  having 
accepted  German  help  and  of  having  planned  with 
Germany's  agents  the  disorganization  of  the  Rus- 
sian army.     It  has  been  even  charged  on  appar- 
ently good  evidence  that  the  leaflets  distributed 
at  the  front  were  printed  with  German  money. 
Trotzky  was   accused  by  Miliukov  in  the  Rech 
(June  7)  of  having  received  $10,000  from  German- 
Americans  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  the  attack 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  5 

on  Kerensky's  government.  Ganetsky  was  forced 
to  leave  Denmark  by  an  order  of  the  Danish  gov- 
ernment, having  been  convicted  of  dishonest  deal- 
ings in  a  Danish  court.  Zinoviev  is  accused  of 
forgery.  Others  are  also  under  suspicion  which  has 
been  only  increased  by  the  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment of  Burtzev  who  is  known  for  his  untiring 
efforts  to  hunt  do'\\Ti  traitors  to  the  cause  of  the 
Russian  Revolution  and  who  had  important  evi- 
dence in  his  possession.  It  is  also  a  remarkable 
fact  that  the  majority  of  the  present  leaders  are 
kno^Ti  broadly  only  under  assumed  names.  Le- 
nine's  true  name  is  Uljanov,  Trotzky's  —  Bron- 
stein,  Zinoviev's  —  Apfelbaum,  Sukhanov's  — 
Gimmer,  Kamenev's  —  Rosenfeld,  Steklov's  — 
Nakhamkis,  and  a  number  of  others  whose  identity 
is  not  even  always  known.  Trotzky's  assertion 
that  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Government  is  a 
government  of  workingmen,  soldiers,  and  peasants 
is  therefore  nothing  but  a  perversion  of  facts. 

There  is,  however,  nothing  extraordinary  in  the 
fact  itself  that  intellectuals  are  the  real  leaders  of 
all  Russian  parties.  Better  education  and  wider 
knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  the  world  have  always 
appealed  to  the  dark  masses  who  realize  only  dimly 
their  own  desires  and  grasp  at  any  concrete  formu- 
lation of  reforms  which  contains  a  tangible  promise 
or  seems  to  express  those  desires.  At  the  same 
time  they  often  put  their  own  meaning  into  the 
words  of  their  leaders,  which  is  true  even  of  factory 
workers  in  the  larger  cities.  As  for  the  peasants, 
representing  about  90  per  cent  of  the  entire  popula- 


6  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

tion,  they  are  still  very  poorly  educated,  questions 
of  national  import  remain  outside  their  horizon, 
and  even  their  language  is  not  the  language  of 
the  educated  Russian,  inasmuch  as  it  lacks  the 
rich  vocabulary  of  modern  life  and  is  devoid  of  the 
very  conceptions  to  which  this  vast  treasury  of 
words  applies.  Their  mind,  great  as  it  is  in  its  po- 
tentialities, still  moves  in  the  furrows  of  familiar 
ideas  abhorring  things  too  much  at  variance  with 
inherited  traditions  or  actual  experience.  Yet  in 
the  turmoil  of  revolutionary  activity  the  peasants 
are  going  to  have  their  say  and  may  become  the 
decisive  factor,  because  they  are  voters  and  are 
casting  their  votes  for  those  leaders  whose  words 
they  believe  to  contain  the  greatest  promise  and 
the  least  menace  of  a  general  disruption  of  their 
accustomed  mode  of  life. 

We  are  thus  brought  back,  for  the  present  at 
least,  to  the  necessity  of  recognizing  that  even  the 
state  of  anarchy  under  which  Russia  is  laboring, 
even  the  rule  of  the  renowned  proletariat  so  much 
trumpeted  about  by  Lenine  and  Trotzky,  is  in  real- 
ity the  work  of  intellectuals,  an  answer  of  the 
masses  to  the  call  of  their  leaders,  a  groping  for 
principles  beyond  their  perception. 

It  suffices  a  very  casual  examination  of  the  pro- 
grams and  resolutions  of  various  political  parties 
to  see  the  truth  of  this  statement.  They  are  ex- 
pressive of  the  opinions  of  the  leaders,  not  of  the 
masses;  are  couched  in  the  language  of  the  edu- 
cated Russian,  not  in  that  of  the  workman  or 
peasant  and,  except  for  the  concluding  slogans  like 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  7 

"  Peace,  Bread,  and  Land,"  are  alien  to  the  very 
spirit  of  the  masses.  In  this  respect  all  parties  are 
confronted  with  the  same  difficulty  since  all  strive 
to  get  the  support  of  the  masses,  yet  have  to  express 
principles  evolved  through  careful  and  extensive 
study  of  national,  political,  and  economic  problems, 
strange  to  the  uneducated  mind.  For  the  same 
reason  the  methods  of  surmounting  the  difficulty 
differ  in  many  respects  and  are  characteristic  of 
each  party. 

The  Conservative  Intellectuals  of  Russia  early 
realized  the  necessity  of  meeting  the  peasant  on 
his  own  ground  and  the  advantage  of  appealing  to 
him  in  his  own  language.  The  idea  of  a  benev- 
olent ruler,  an  all-suffering  motherland,  and  an  all- 
unifying  church  exercised  a  powerful  appeal  upon 
the  imagination,  for  a  long  time  superseding  and 
forcing  into  the  background  the  growing, elemental, 
and  unfulfilled  longing  for  more  land.  The  ide- 
ology of  a  perfect  monarchy  is  so  simple  and  its 
shortcomings  so  easily  attributable  to  dishonesty 
of  officials,  that  it  answered  the  peasant's  thoughts 
as  long  as  he  was  not  able  to  see  the  folly  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  the  system  and  its  realization, 
but  separated  in  his  mind  the  image  of  his  loving 
monarch  from  the  cruel  reality  of  everyday  life 
as  he  still  distinguishes  between  the  faith  and  the 
priest.  The  great  mistake  of  all  conservatives  is 
that  they  seek  to  bring  about  a  state  of  perfect 
justice  by  improving  only  the  quality  of  the  ruling 
body  without  changing  the  conditions  of  life  of  the 
ruled  mass.     Yet  even  so  the  Conservatives  had 


8  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

quite  a  following  among  the  peasants  up  to  the 
time  of  the  revolution  of  1917  and  in  a  way  may 
still  have  a  future  before  them. 

The  Oetoberists  find  no  support  in  the  masses 
and  do  not  make  any  serious  attempt  to  gain  it. 
They  frankly  acknowledged  themselves  as  the 
party  of  industry  and  trade,  having  no  wider  in- 
terests at  heart  than  the  maintenance  of  order 
and  law  throughout  the  country.  Their  leaders 
were  forced  into  a  revolutionary  attitude  only  at 
the  time  when  there  was  danger  of  a  universal  col- 
lapse of  Russia  if  the  tsar's  government  persisted, 
and  they  may  be  forced  to  join  in  a  counter-revolu- 
tion, if  their  interests  are  again  endangered.  Their 
ideology  is  that  of  a  capitalistic  class  and  their 
power  depends  entirely  on  the  future  development 
of  industry  and  trade  in  Russia.  For  the  present 
they  are  nowhere.  Unable  to  find  a  new  basis  for 
their  activity  in  place  of  class  interest,  they  lack 
unity  of  purpose  and  are  deserted  by  their  own 
former  supporters  among  their  employees.  Trade 
and  industry  are  disorganized  and  the  party  may 
never  be  resurrected. 

The  Constitutional  Democrats  are  in  this  respect 
better  off.  They  find  their  support  chiefly  among 
more  or  less  educated  people  of  various  pursuits: 
lawyers,  bankers,  brokers,  journalists,  teachers, 
artists,  scientists,  etc.  Their  program  embraces  the 
interests  of  all  classes  and  demands  political,  judi- 
cial, economic,  industrial  and  agrarian  legislation 
of  a  very  radical  and  extensive  kind.  Their  hori- 
zon of  vision  includes  the  sufferings  and  aspirations 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  9 

of  the  often  incongruous  elements  of  the  vast 
whole,  but  their  ideology  is  still  based  on  the  long 
outworn  idealistic  capitalism  and  for  this  reason 
alone  does  not  and  cannot  appeal  to  not-owning 
classes.  Their  agrarian  program  is  in  this  respect 
the  most  striking  example.  It  is  worked  out  in 
great  detail  and  is  aimed  at  a  betterment  of  the 
condition  of  peasants  without  deep  injury  to  the 
present  landowners.  It  recognizes  the  right  of 
the  peasant  to  more  land,  it  provides  for  future 
state  ownership  of  land  to  prevent  it  from  falling 
into  wrong  hands,  but  does  not  condemn  the  prin- 
ciple of  landownership,  nor  the  injustice  of  present 
ownership,  and  for  that  reason  elaborates  a  method 
of  compensation  for  compulsorily  alienated  land 
through  universal  taxation. 

To  avoid  excessive  burden  to  the  impoverished 
peasant  the  compensation  is  to  be  in  the  shape  of 
bonds  representing  the  average  value  of  the  land 
in  each  particular  case,  only  the  interest  on  these 
bonds  to  be  paid  yearly  from  universal  taxes  —  a 
topsy-turvy  mortgage  system,  as  it  were,  in  which 
the  state  becomes  the  proprietor  and  mortgagor  of 
the  land,  while  its  present  owners  are  turned  into 
forced  mortgagees.  Under  this  system  the  peas- 
ants will  get  all  land  available,  but  90  per  cent  will 
have  to  pay  for  what  is  owned  by  a  small  fraction 
of  even  the  remaining  10  per  cent  of  the  entire  pop- 
ulation. The  proposed  scheme  proved  to  be  too 
radical  for  the  tsar's  government  in  1906  and 
caused  the  downfall  of  the  first  Duma.  It  pro- 
voked at  the  time  bitter  comment  in  Germany  also, 


10  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

where  the  conservative  and  national-liberal  press 
accused  the  Russian  Constitutional  Democratic 
party  of  putting  forward  impossible  demands  and 
of  attacking  the  very  principle  of  property  owner- 
ship. Yet  the  principle  underlying  the  proposed 
reform  is  unquestionably  capitalistic  and  is  the 
chief  cause  of  the  hatred  and  contempt  which  the 
party  enjoys  on  the  part  of  Social-Democrats. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  sixties  the  conservative 
land  committee  appointed  by  Alexander  II,  com- 
posed of  hereditary  landowners,  avowed  enemies 
of  any  economic  liberation  of  peasants,  out  of 
fear  that  private  ownership  of  land  might  enrich 
the  peasants  and  make  them  dangerous  to  the 
established  order,  devised  a  scheme  of  communal 
ownership  of  land  and  unconsciously  taught  the 
peasants  the  principles  of  socialism.  In  1907  Con- 
stitutional Democrats  opposed  the  bill  of  the  Gov- 
ernment for  the  dissolution  of  land  communities 
and  substitution  of  private  for  communal  land 
ownership  at  the  request  of  individual  peasants. 
The  objection  raised  was  on  the  ground  that  peas- 
ants suddenly  possessed  of  a  chance  to  get  ready 
money  would  sell  their  land  to  a  few  exploiters  and 
being  unable  to  put  it  to  good  use  would  rapidly 
become  paupers.  The  best  men  in  the  Duma  op- 
posed Stolypin's  bill,  and  the  law  was  introduced 
by  stealth  and  promulgated  during  a  forced  recess 
of  the  Duma.  Contrary  to  expectation  the  law 
neither  led  to  the  results  desired  by  the  Govern- 
ment, nor  to  those  feared  by  Constitutional  Demo- 
crats.   It  remained  a  dead  letter.    Few  members  of 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  11 

peasant  communities  applied  for  separation.  The 
Government  tried  to  boost  its  scheme  by  building 
at  its  own  expense  model,  fake  peasant  homes.  The 
peasants  had  already  their  own  idea  as  to  remedies 
in  regard  to  land  shortage  and  did  not  want  any 
substitute. 

The  difficulty  of  making  the  peasant  respect  the 
principle  of  private  ownership  of  land  is  due  to 
man}'  causes.  The  most  liberal  minded  land- 
owners were  usually  those  who  spent  their  winters 
in  various  occupations  in  large  cities  and  used  their 
estates  as  summer  homes  and  a  partial  source  of  in- 
come. The  work  of  supervision  was  only  too  often 
intrusted  to  utterly  unscrupulous  and  uneducated 
managers  belonging  to  the  peasant  class,  while  the 
neighboring  peasants  were  employed  as  day  labor- 
ers in  the  field  and  garden.  This  kind  of  labor 
was  already  available,  because  peasants  were  un- 
able to  derive  sufficient  income  from  their  own 
land  to  pay  the  heavy  taxes  and  to  support  their 
families.  Scarcely  any  landowners  understood 
anything  of  agriculture  and  few  paid  any  attention 
to  it.  I  know  splendid  estates  which  brought  in 
miserable  incomes,  not  normal  even  under  the  an- 
tiquated system  of  four  year  crop  rotation  and 
quite  absurd  if  measured  by  standards  of  modern 
American  farming,  yet  sufficient  to  place  at  the 
disposal  of  the  owners  a  splendid  mansion  in  Mos- 
cow or  Petrograd  and  a  no  less  splendid  summer 
home  on  their  estate.  There,  during  the  hot  sum- 
mer days,  the  owners  were  enjoying  their  comfort 
in  idleness  and  talking  of  reforms  necessary  for  the 


12  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

benefit  of  the  peasants,  while  peasant  women  were 
cutting  the  wheat  for  them  with  sickles,  stooping 
and  sweating  under  the  scorching  rays  of  the  sun. 
The  superintendents  of  those  estates  enriched 
themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  blind  or  careless 
and  carefree  owners  under  the  very  eyes  of  the 
peasants  who  hated  the  superintendents,  pitied 
or  despised  the  liberal  owners,  as  the  case  might 
be,  and  gloomily  compared  their  own  poverty 
and  labor  with  the  ease  and  wealth  of  their  em- 
ployers. 

The  more  thrifty  and  less  liberal  owners,  who  re- 
mained the  greater  part  of  the  year  on  their  estates, 
were  perhaps  more  respected  but  still  less  liked. 
Any  attempt  at  careful  management  of  the  estate 
was  invariably  considered  to  be  a  sign  of  stinginess 
or  of  hardheartedness.  The  idea  of  property  is  not 
clearly  defined  in  the  mind  of  the  average  peasant 
who  considers  plants  that  are  not  planted  but  grow 
wild  to  be  a  gift  of  God.  In  disputes  involving 
such  cases  the  line  between  rightful  possession  and 
theft  is  difficult  to  draw,  and  men  who  took  the 
controversy  to  court  were  invariably  hated.  A 
glaring  example  of  this  kind  was  an  otherwise 
liberal  minded  landowner,  a  well  known  professor 
of  sociology,  who  spent  three-quarters  of  a  year  in 
lecturing  at  a  foreign  university  of  which  he  was  a 
member  and  who  was  finally  murdered  on  his  own 
estate. 

The  home  life  of  even  liberal  intellectuals  was 
another  barrier  between  them  and  the  masses. 
Not  only  was  coarse  food  considered  to  be  good 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  13 

enough  for  domestics,  but  they  seldom,  if  ever,  had 
a  decent  corner  for  themselves  in  the  house  and 
their  miserable  wages  were  out  of  all  proportion 
with  the  long  hours  of  service  required.  Many 
families  had  guests  almost  daily,  the  company  sit- 
ting around  a  samovar,  discussing  and  conversing 
until  one  or  two  in  the  morning,  while  the  sleepy 
domestics  were  stealing  a  nap  in  the  anteroom, 
ready  to  appear  at  the  call  of  the  mistress.  The 
table  had  to  be  cleared  after  the  guests  and  the 
family  retired  for  the  night  and  the  breakfast  had 
to  be  prepared,  boots  polished,  stoves  heated, 
rooms  cleaned  in  the  early  morning.  For  the 
master  might  rest  until  ten  or  eleven,  but  the 
children  have  to  be  at  school  by  eight  and  the  ser- 
vants must  be  ready  to  serve  them.  And  though 
many  families  kept  professional  servants,  the  coun- 
try homes  depended  almost  entirely  in  winter  as 
well  as  in  summer  on  local  help. 

Attempts  to  improve  the  condition  of  peasants 
were  numerous  and  in  some  respects  successful, 
but  found  an  obstacle  on  the  one  hand  in  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Government  and  on  the  other  in  the 
conservatism  and  suspicion  of  the  peasants  them- 
selves. Fire  insurance  and  cooperative  enter- 
prises helped  to  a  certain  degree,  but  an  almost 
complete  absence  of  expert  agriculturists  in  the 
ranks  of  the  landowners  prevented  them  from 
demonstrating  on  their  own  estates  the  value  of 
applied  knowledge  as  well  as  from  teaching  the 
peasants  how  to  increase  the  productivity  of  the 
land  through  intensive  farming. 


14  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  the  vast  majority  of 
landowners,  both  conservative  and  liberal,  re- 
mained strangers  to  the  people  among  whom  they 
lived,  whose  labor  they  employed,  and  for  whose 
welfare  many  were  in  earnest  concerned.  The 
Constitutional  Democratic  party  is  strong  in  the 
cities.  In  the  country  it  has  no  followers  and 
in  the  sweeping  incendiary  fires  of  1905-06  estates 
were  burned  which  belonged  in  several  cases  to 
men  who  spent  their  life  in  fighting  for  freedom 
against  the  tsar's  government. 

No  less  unfortunate  is  the  party  in  its  relation  to 
the  class  of  factory  workers.  That  part  of  its  pro- 
gram which  relates  to  the  labor  question  embraces 
a  number  of  important  reforms  meeting  almost  all 
demands  of  the  working  class.  The  barrier  be- 
tween them  is  the  capitalistic  principle.  A  perusal 
of  the  lists  of  Constitutional  Democrats  who  have 
subscribed  large  sums  for  the  Russian  liberty  loan 
will  show  why  workmen  speak  of  them  as  capital- 
ists even  though  the  party  has  accepted  the  princi- 
ple of  progressive  income  taxation.  There  is  a 
feeling  of  intense  hatred  toward  all  Constitutional 
Democrats  on  the  part  of  all  workmen. 

Nothing  is  more  instructive  than  the  rapid 
change  in  the  position  which  the  Constitutional 
Democratic  party  occupied  in  the  eyes  of  the  people 
after  the  revolution.  Before  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities all  parties  were  against  war.  But  soon, 
under  the  influence  of  the  German  methods  of  war- 
fare in  Belgium,  France,  and  Russia,  the  feeling 
changed.    Even  the  Mensheviki  among  the  Social- 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  15 

Democrats  declared  themselves  in  favor  of  war  and 
the  only  party  remaining  firm  in  condemning  all 
Avar  was  that  of  the  Bolsheviki.  The  entrance  of 
the  Turks  into  the  war  was  almost  considered  a 
godsend  by  the  Constitutional  Democrats,  Octo- 
berists,  and  Conservatives  in  the  Duma  because  it 
cleared  the  way  for  a  final  settlement  of  the  Balkan 
problem  and  promised  the  elimination  of  Turkey 
from  Europe.  Long  after  Sazonov  was  removed, 
when  the  consent  of  England  and  France  to  give 
Russia  free  hand  in  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  was  read  in  a  telegram  before  the  Duma,  a 
general  outburst  of  enthusiasm  took  place,  the 
members  demanding  to  know  why  Sazonov,  who 
was  justly  credited  with  this  achievement,  was  in 
retirement  and  not  in  charge  of  the  foreign  office 
which  he  should  have  held  by  right.  Miliukov's 
speeches  and  writings  on  the  future  settlement  of 
the  Balkan  problem  were  jokingly  spoken  of  as  his 
dissertation  for  the  degree  of  foreign  secretary.  At 
home  the  party  was  pursuing  a  policy  of  patient 
endurance,  postponing  strife  for  the  future  until 
the  crimes  of  the  tsar's  government  made  further 
silence  impossible.  At  that  time  the  whole  tissue 
of  treason  was  not  yet  known,  but  enough  was  in 
evidence  to  demand  vigorous  protest.  Not  being 
a  revolutionary  party  the  Constitutional  Demo- 
crats abstained  from  any  action  not  strictly  within 
the  law  and  merely  condemned  the  activity  of  the 
Government.  They  desired  amelioration  of  the 
fundamental  laws,  but  even  that  they  would  have 
preferred  to  accomplish  by  persuasion  rather  than 


16  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

by  force.  In  fact  they  considered  socialist  demands 
unreasonable,  socialization  of  Russia  premature, 
and  any  violent  overthrow  unwise  and  hazardous. 
For  the  latter  opinion  they  found  support  in  the 
failure  of  the  uprising  of  the  working  class  in  1905- 
06,  when  the  punitive  expeditions  proved  the  loy- 
alty of  the  army  to  the  throne.  Consequently  the 
attitude  of  the  army  in  the  memorable  days  of  the 
March  revolution  was  a  great  surprise  to  them. 
At  the  same  time  they  attributed  to  themselves  the 
lion  share  in  the  overthrow,  presumably  on  the 
ground  that  masses  follow  leaders  and  the  Con- 
stitutional Democrats  were  the  only  ones  who  had 
a  chance  for  open  protest  in  the  Duma  and  made 
use  of  it.  This  delusion  led  to  a  series  of  tactical 
errors  and  cost  them  dearly.  In  all  elections  they 
polled  a  comparatively  small  vote.  Trying  to  save 
Russia  for  the  Allies  they  failed  to  meet  the 
Russian  Socialists  on  their  own  ground  and  were 
forced  to  explain  away  differences  of  opinion  much 
too  thoroughgoing  to  be  explained  away.  In  a 
country  which  is  in  the  throes  of  the  most  remark- 
able revolution  ever  witnessed,  they  tried  to  apply 
non-revolutionary  methods  and  drew  on  themselves 
the  suspicion  of  the  masses  of  being  counter- 
revolutionists.  From  the  very  moment  when  Mil- 
iukov  announced  the  passing  of  the  supreme  power 
from  the  Tsar  to  Grand  Duke  Michail,  when  his 
words  were  answered  by  angry  shouts  in  favor  of 
a  democratic  republic,  the  position  of  the  party 
became  precarious.  They  had  either  to  revise 
their  own  program  and  to  catch  up  with  the  rush 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  17 

of  the  progressive  current,  or  else  to  find  themselves 
in  the  role  of  inundated  rocks  over  which  the 
waters  flow.  The  announcement  that  the  party 
would  support  a  demand  for  a  republic  was  too  late 
to  change  the  first  impression,  while  the  proposition 
to  accept  unconditional  expropriation  of  land  in 
place  of  the  compensation  plan  was  defeated  in 
heated  debate  at  the  party  convention.  Under 
normal  circumstances  the  party  would  have  prob- 
ably been  steadily  losing  support,  but  the  arrest 
and  imprisonment  of  the  best  and  highly  honored 
leaders  by  the  Bolsheviki  is  bound  to  put  fresh 
vigor  into  their  efforts  and  give  new  life  to  their 
cause. 

The  leaders  of  the  Bolsheviki  themselves  have 
fallen  into  error  of  a  different  kind.  Being  prima- 
rily^ a  party  of  the  wage  earning  day  laborers,  the 
program  of  the  Bolsheviki  puts  the  interest  of  the 
proletariat  above  everything  else.  From  insufli- 
cient  observation  of  peasant  life  and  the  fact  that 
peasants  want  socialization  of  land,  they  jump  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  country  is  ready  for  com- 
plete socialization.  Only  the  more  educated  lead- 
ers among  them  realize  that  such  a  conclusion  is 
premature.  But  to  bring  about  the  necessary 
change  in  as  near  a  future  as  possible,  the  leaders 
of  the  Bolsheviki  have  fanned  hatred  of  the  pro- 
letariat toward  the  "  bourgeois  "  classes.  One 
must  give  them  credit  in  this  respect.  They  know 
the  value  of  simple  language  when  they  put  this 
hatred  into  words.  Listen  to  the  Russian  Marseil- 
laise:   "  Rise,  brothers,   all  at  once  against  the 


18  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

thieves,  the  curs  —  the  rich  ones !  Against  the 
vampire  Tsar !  Beat  them,  kill  them  —  the  cursed 
evil-doers !  Glow,  dawn  of  better  life !  "  The  simple 
ideology,  the  easy  catch  phrases  in  which  the 
language  of  this  ideology  is  couched,  the  primeval 
character  of  the  passion  aroused,  contribute  to  the 
success  which  the  party  enjoys  among  working 
people  and  homeless  paupers.  Therein  lies  the 
power  of  the  Bolsheviki.  But  reaction  is  bound  to 
come  and  here  again  the  peasants  will  play  the 
chief  role.  All  accounts  of  conversations  with 
peasants  tend  to  show  that  they  have  very  vague 
ideas  of  socialism.  In  fact  the  Social-Democrats 
have  not  taken  the  trouble  to  acquaint  the  peas- 
ants with  the  principles  of  their  teaching,  leaving 
that  field  almost  entirely  to  the  influence  of  social- 
ist-revolutionists. 

Among  the  intellectuals  none  have  come  nearer 
to  the  understanding  of  peasant  psychology  than 
those  men  and  women  who  from  the  first  espoused 
the  cause  of  the  peasant.  Realizing  the  space 
separating  educated  men  from  their  less  fortunate 
brothers,  they  gave  up  their  life  as  intellectuals  and 
"  went  among  the  people."  They  donned  peasant 
garb  and  acquired  peasant  tongue.  From  this 
group  of  workers  for  freedom  later  the  Socialist- 
revolutionary  party  developed.  "  All  land  for  the 
peasant  "  is  their  slogan,  while  their  promise  to 
expropriate  all  land  without  any  compensation 
naturally  meets  with  approval  on  the  part  of  the 
land-hungry  peasants.  Moreover,  their  program 
does  not  demand  immediate  complete  socialization 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  19 

of  Russia,  leaving  that  to  a  gradual  process  of  evo- 
lution and  change  of  existing  conditions.  In  the 
ten  years  preceding  the  first  revolution  thousands 
of  young  intellectuals  joined  the  party  and  fought 
the  tsar's  regime.  They  showed  a  degree  of  self- 
abnegation  found  only  in  people  whose  heart  is 
kindled  with  the  true  spirit  of  devotion  to  a  great 
cause.  The  revolution  of  1905  would  never  have 
taken  place  but  for  their  organized  "  terror  from 
below."  The  high  regard  held  for  them  by  the 
widest  circles  has  caused  their  rise  in  power  during 
the  first  two  months  of  the  revolution  of  1917.  But 
tactical  errors  committed  by  the  leaders  of  the 
party  as  well  as  dissensions  within  the  party  itself 
contributed  to  a  rather  rapid  change  of  sentiment 
toward  them  on  all  sides.  In  a  measure  as  the 
Constitutional  Democrats  vigorously  objected  to 
their  policy  to  put  into  life  as  soon  as  possible  the 
agrarian  reforms  promised  by  them,  the  Social- 
Democrats  on  their  part  attacked  them  for  their 
moderation  in  other  demands.  For  some  reason  not 
yet  clear,  Kerensky  was  slighted  in  the  very  begin- 
ning of  his  political  career  when  his  nomination  to 
the  executive  council  of  the  Socialist-revolutionist 
party  was  opposed  by  a  large  majority.  Just  as 
the  Constitutional  Democrats  made  a  series  of  tac- 
tical errors  due  to  the  fact  that  they  thought  them- 
selves representative  of  the  spirit  of  the  Russian 
people,  whereas  in  reality  they  stood  sponsors  only 
for  a  relatively  small  minority,  even  so  the  Social- 
ist-revolutionists misjudged  the  attitude  of  other 
parties  toward  themselves.     They  overrated  the 


20  THE  INTELLECTUALS 

ability  of  the  masses  to  distinguish  between  their 
attitude  toward  war  in  general  and  the  necessity 
to  continue  the  present  war.  They  overrated  the 
ability  of  the  soldiers  to  distinguish  between  slavish 
obedience  and  military  discipline.  They  tried  to 
play  the  role  of  a  center.  They  tried  to  mediate 
between  Social-Democrats  and  Constitutional 
Democrats  and  naturally  failed  in  this  attempt. 
Some  of  their  leaders,  notably  Mr.  Tschernov, 
were  accused  by  Constitutional  Democrats  of  being 
pro-German  if  not  actual  German  agents.  Others, 
including  Kerensky  himself  and  even  Mme. 
Breshkovsky,  were  accused  by  the  Bolsheviki  of 
having  been  almost  bribed  by  the  capitalistic  in- 
terests of  America,  England,  and  France.  Needless 
to  say  that  the  accusations  had  no  basis  whatever 
in  actual  facts  and  represent  simply  an  ugly  out- 
growth of  misguided  jealousy  of  the  masses  to 
guard  their  dearly  won  right  to  a  social  revolution 
against  those  whom  they  consider  the  worst  ene- 
mies of  socialism,  and  the  desire  of  unscrupulous 
leaders  to  profit  by  it.  Thus  the  Socialist-revolu- 
tionists were  gradually  relegated  in  the  mind  of 
the  extremists  to  the  great  body  of  the  hated 
"  bourgeois."  Only  in  their  rightful  element, 
among  the  peasants,  they  continue  to  enjoy  a  great 
deal  of  popularity,  and  the  returns  to  the  Constit- 
uent Assembly  show  that  theirs  will  be  the  abso- 
lute majority  even  though  they  lost  some  of  their 
popularity. 

The  progress  of  the  Russian  Revolution  presents 
a  sad  spectacle  of  an  almost  complete  failure  on  the 


THE  INTELLECTUALS  21 

part  of  the  majority  of  intellectuals  to  understand 
the  spirit  of  the  times  and  to  guide  the  masses 
through  the  labyrinth  of  errors.  In  days  past  the 
Russian  intellectuals  were  the  forefighters  for  free- 
dom and  the  Russian  people  will  ever  be  indebted 
to  them  for  this.  They  prepared  the  soil  for  the 
revolution  by  spreading  ideas  of  freedom  by  all 
means  at  their  disposal.  They  weakened  the  tsar's 
power  and  thus  contributed  to  its  overthrow  by 
persistent  attacks  upon  the  system  of  autocratic 
government.  They  helped  to  awaken  the  spirit  of 
self-consciousness  in  the  masses.  But  they  did  not 
evolve  new  principles.  They  did  not  open  wide 
avenues  for  the  development  of  a  new  order 
of  social  organization.  They  misunderstood  the 
masses  and  consequently  were  unable  to  control  the 
forces  set  loose.  And  if  Russia  is  going  to  be  saved 
from  utter  ruin  amidst  the  clamor  and  strife  of 
party  leaders  and  to  evolve  a  new  democratic  sys- 
tem, it  will  be  due  not  to  the  intellectuals,  but  to 
the  great  spirit  of  the  dark  masses  of  the  Russian 
peasants. 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  RUSSIAN 
REVOLUTION 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  RUSSIAN 
REVOLUTION 

By  SAMUEL  N.  HARPER 

ONE  was  struck  by  the  remarkable  unity  that 
characterized  the  short  first  period  of  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution  of  last  March.  One  knew,  however, 
that  there  were  two  distinct  sets  of  forces  behind 
the  movement,  operating  through  two  kinds  of  or- 
ganizations. There  were  first  the  already  existing 
and  parliamentary  institutions  which  had  become 
revolutionary  in  spirit  and  methods  of  action.  On 
the  other  hand  there  were  the  institutions  produced 
by  the  revolution  itself,  emerging  from  the  chaos 
in  the  midst  of  which  the  other,  already  function- 
ing bodies,  were  trying  to  take  a  new  and  directing 
line.  The  most  prominent  of  the  first  type  of  in- 
stitution was  the  Duma,  the  legislative  parliament 
of  the  old  regime,  and  of  the  second  type,  the  Petro- 
grad  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies. 
The  Duma,  however,  was  only  one  of  several 
legal  institutions  that  had  developed  under  the  old 
regime,  and  represented  the  first  stages  of  parlia- 
mentary, popular  government.  There  were  the 
local  provincial  and  municipal  councils,  and  also 
the  officially  recognized  war-industry  committees, 
which  had  come  to  have  semi-governmental  func- 
tions.   Finally  one  could  bring  under  this  category, 

95 


26  FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

with  a  little  forcing,  the  cooperative  societies, 
which  had  assumed  enormous  importance  during 
the  two  and  a  half  years  of  war. 

In  these  institutions  we  had  self-government, 
and  participation  in  public  affairs,  and  also  the 
idea  of  cooperation  between  the  various  classes  and 
political  tendencies  —  the  idea  of  coalition.  The 
election  law  of  the  Duma  provided  for  the  repre- 
sentation of  all  group  interests  of  the  community, 
and  representation  by  an  actual  member  of  the 
group,  by  a  bona  fide  peasant  in  the  case  of  the 
peasantry.  The  seats  in  the  assembly  were  dis- 
tributed specifically  to  landlords,  manufacturers, 
the  smaller  bourgeoisie,  workmen,  and  peasants. 
The  election  law  of  the  local  government  bodies 
made  similar  provision  for  group  representation. 
On  the  war-industry  committees,  the  workmen 
had  elected  representatives,  sitting  with  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  manufacturers  and  owners. 
In  the  cooperative  movement  the  bourgeois-intel- 
lectual element  had  taken  the  initiative,  but  had 
always  emphasized  the  direct  participation  of  the 
workmen  and  peasants  in  the  actual  management 
of  the  societies,  as  the  theory  of  the  movement 
demanded. 

Thus  the  broader  democratic  classes  of  the  coun- 
try, the  workmen  and  peasants,  were  represented 
in  the  somewhat  popular  institutions  that  had 
developed  under  the  old  regime.  But  the  actual 
control  was  in  the  hands  of  the  less  democratic  ele- 
ments —  the  landlords,  the  manufacturers,  men  of 
the  liberal  professions,  and  of  the  so-called  Intelli- 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     27 

gentsia  class.  Most  of  these  men  were  of  liberal 
and  democratic  tendencies,  but  they  were  in  actual 
fact,  as  compared  with  the  broader  masses,  of  the 
privileged  classes.  They  had  emphasized  always 
the  essentially  democratic  character  of  the  activity 
of  the  institutions  in  which  they  were  the  leaders. 
They  put  particular  stress  on  the  fact  that  the 
activities  of  the  local  provincial  councils,  for  ex- 
ample, were  directed  mainly  toward  the  ameliora- 
tion of  conditions  of  life  among  the  peasantry. 
But  the  fact  that  the  control  over  these  institu- 
tions, even  in  the  cooperative  movement  (so  far  as 
independent  control  was  allowed  by  the  bureau- 
cracy of  the  old  regime),  was  secured  to  the  less 
democratic  elements  of  the  community,  did  con- 
tradict the  idea  of  coalition,  of  the  bringing  together 
of  all  interests  and  forces.  These  institutions  had 
been  permitted  to  exist  and  develop  only  because 
they  were  controlled  by  the  more  conservative 
groups.  The  cooperative  societies  represented  more 
truly  the  idea  of  coalition.  Here  in  the  coopera- 
tive movement  the  leaders  of  political  liberalism 
had  always  noted  with  relief  that  one  was  gradu- 
ally attaining  the  end  toward  which  they  knew 
they  must  work  —  the  organic  union  between  the 
so-called  Intelligentsia,  and  the  "people,"  meaning 
the  broader,  democratic  classes. 

When  the  anarchy  resulting  from  the  incompe- 
tence, stupidity  and  perhaps  treason  of  the  old 
bureaucracy  reached  such  an  acute  stage  in  the 
first  weeks  of  March  that  the  leaders  of  the  Rus- 
sian public  saw  that  some  action  must  be  taken  by 


28     FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

some  one,  it  was  the  Duma  that  assumed  the  initia- 
tive, acting  in  a  revolutionary  manner,  through  an 
executive  committee.  The  municipal  and  provin- 
cial councils,  organized  in  unions  for  war-work, 
and  the  war-industry  committees,  turned  without 
delay  to  the  revolutionary  parliament,  in  which 
many  of  their  leading  workers  were  members. 
The  leaders  of  the  cooperative  movement  could  not 
act  with  such  rapidity  and  precision.  They  had 
not  been  permitted  to  organize  a  central  commit- 
tee, to  coordinate  the  work  of  the  thousands  of 
small  and  scattered  societies.  These  first  leaders 
of  the  revolution  felt  justified  in  taking  the  initia- 
tive because  they  alone  were  organized.  Also  they 
thought  they  could  speak  in  the  name  of  all  classes, 
including  the  most  democratic,  because  the  institu- 
tions through  which  they  acted  did  include  repre- 
sentatives of  all  classes.  To  emphasize  its  special 
anxiety  that  the  more  democratic  groups  feel  their 
direct  participation  in  the  movement  of  which  it 
had  taken  the  leadership,  the  Executive  Commit- 
tee of  the  Duma  not  only  accepted  but  encouraged 
the  development  of  the  revolutionary  institutions 
of  the  second  category,  of  which  the  first  to  emerge 
was  the  Petrograd  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Deputies. 

This  Council  was  organized  during  the  very  first 
days  of  the  revolution;  it  was  in  fact  the  resurrec- 
tion of  a  revolutionary  body  of  the  1905  revolution. 
The  Duma  invited  the  Council  to  share  its  own 
convenient  quarters.  Perhaps  the  invitation  was 
an  afterthought,  for  the  workmen  and  soldiers  of 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     29 

Petrograd  in  revolt  had  gravitated  toward  the 
Duma,  had  calmly  entered  and  taken  possession 
of  the  large  corridors  of  the  palace.  The  Council 
was  a  strictly  revolutionary,  and  a  very  democratic 
body,  composed  of  directly  elected  delegates  from 
the  factories  and  garrison  regiments  of  Petrograd. 
It  immediately  became  the  organizing  center  for 
what  came  to  be  called  the  "revolutionary  democ- 
racy," as  opposed  to  the  "  bourgeoisie." 

The  Executive  Committee  of  the  Duma  con- 
sulted with  the  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Deputies  on  the  composition  of  the  proposed  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  on  the  political  program 
to  be  announced.  For  as  we  saw,  it  was  the  first 
thought  of  these  leaders  to  secure  unity  of  action. 
They  recognized  that  the  Council  did  in  fact  rep- 
resent "  revolutionary  democracy,"  at  least  of 
Petrograd.  As  the  workmen  and  soldiers  of  Petro- 
grad were  completely  out  of  hand,  armed  and 
fighting  on  the  streets,  arresting  oflScers,  ministers 
and  police,  and  showing  a  tendency  to  start  gen- 
eral and  anarchic  pillaging,  the  Duma  leaders  saw 
a  restraining  authority  in  the  Council  of  these 
same  workmen  and  soldiers.  They  therefore  either 
did  not  wish,  or  did  not  dare,  to  object  at  the  time 
to  the  famous  order  No.  1  to  the  garrison  of  Petro- 
grad, issued  by  the  Council,  and  not  by  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Duma.  Many  have  claimed 
that  this  particular  order,  which  was  extended  to 
the  front,  was  responsible  for  the  later  demorali- 
zation of  the  whole  Russian  army.  Others,  the 
leaders  of  revolutionary  democracy,  have  insisted 


30  FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

that  this  order  prevented  the  immediate  and  com- 
plete collapse  of  the  whole  army. 

In  preparing  the  slate  for  the  new  government, 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Duma  selected 
one  of  the  presiding  oflScers  of  the  Council,  Ke- 
rensky.  When  Miliukov,  the  Duma  leader,  an- 
nounced the  composition  of  the  new  provisional 
government  to  the  crowd,  composed  largely  of 
workmen  and  soldiers  gathered  in  the  main  cor- 
ridors of  the  Duma,  he  emphasized  the  cooperation 
between  Duma  and  Council,  the  consent  of  Keren- 
sky  to  enter  the  government,  and  also  the  fact  that 
most  of  the  members  of  the  new  government  had 
worked  in  and  through  institutions,  in  which  peas- 
ants and  workmen  also  had  been  represented. 

Though  the  word  "  coalition  "  was  not  used 
during  the  first  weeks  of  the  revolution,  one  had 
constantly  in  mind  the  idea  of  "  bringing  together 
all  the  vital  forces  of  the  country."  In  this  last 
expression  I  quote  one  of  the  first  and  most  em- 
phasized slogans  of  the  revolution.  But  the  prob- 
lem proved  most  difficult,  complicated  by  the  fact 
that  one  had  to  solve  at  one  and  the  same  time 
two  most  stupendous  tasks.  One  had  to  con- 
solidate the  conquests  of  the  revolution,  and  also 
prosecute  the  war.  The  prosecution  of  the  war 
required  the  acceptance  of  a  strong  authority, 
vested  in  the  Provisional  Government.  But  natu- 
rally the  first  aim  of  the  revolution  was  to  extend 
its  ideas  to  the  rest  of  the  country,  for  the  actual 
overthrow  of  the  old  order  had  been  largely  the 
work  of  Petrograd.     The  two  tasks  were  closely 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     31 

associated  with  one  another,  because  one  could  not 
reorganize  the  country  for  the  war  until  the  new 
ideas  had  taken  root. 

The  first  parliamentary  leaders  wished  to  use  as 
the  basis  for  carrying  out  both  tasks  the  old  in- 
stitutions, the  municipal  and  provincial  councils, 
and  the  cooperative  societies,  at  the  same  time 
taking  steps  gradually  to  democratize  them.  But 
the  strictlj'  revolutionary  leaders  wished  to  democ- 
ratize immediately,  and  put  this  forward  as  the 
first  object  to  be  accomplished.  So  they  demanded 
and  promoted  the  organizing  of  revolutionary  dem- 
ocracy all  over  the  country,  through  councils  of 
workmen,  soldiers,  and  peasants,  through  army 
committees,  land  committees,  professional  unions, 
and  so  forth.  The  champions  of  this  immediate 
democratization  policy  were  almost  exclusively 
members  of  the  various  socialist  parties,  some  of 
them  representing  the  most  extreme  views.  The 
majority  of  them  were  not  consciously  striving  to 
undermine  the  authority  of  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment. They  recognized  and  in  fact  advocated 
the  compromise  represented  in  the  first  group  of 
leaders.  They  trusted  most  of  them,  but  wished  at 
the  same  time  to  organize  revolutionary  democ- 
racy, for  self-protection  for  the  moment,  and  per- 
haps for  self-assertion  at  a  later  date.  But  a 
minority  of  the  socialist  leaders  did  not  take  this 
constructive  line.  From  the  very  start  they  pro- 
fessed to  distrust  the  first  Provisional  Government, 
for  they  did  not  believe  in  "coalition"  —  the  co- 
operation between  the  various  group  interests  of 


32      FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

the  community.  Their  theory  was  that  of  class 
struggle;  they  proclaimed  this  to  be  their  aim,  and 
worked  to  give  to  the  revolution  this  character. 
Though  a  minority,  they  were  a  very  active  and 
energetic  group,  and  tended  to  give  the  tone  in  the 
meetings  and  resolutions  of  revolutionary  democ- 
racy, thus  dulling  the  spirit  of  cooperation,  which 
characterized  the  first  period  of  the  revolution. 

The  extremists  wished  a  social  revolution,  "  per- 
manent revolution,"  class  struggle,  and  they  agi- 
tated openly  and  with  energy.  The  workmen  and 
soldiers  of  Petrograd  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the 
physical  side  of  the  revolution.  Only  workmen 
and  soldiers  had  been  killed  fighting  for  the  revo- 
lution during  that  first  week.  These  particular 
groups  were  therefore  proclaimed  the  "  pride  and 
flower  of  the  revolution,"  and  told  that  they  must 
establish  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  thus 
consolidating  the  conquests  of  the  revolution, 
which  should  not  be  allowed  to  remain  a  mere 
bourgeois  affair. 

The  moderate,  constructive  socialists  did  not 
accept  this  extreme  view,  but  they  nevertheless 
recognized  the  need  for  an  effective  organization 
of  revolutionary  democracy  all  over  the  country, 
to  ensure  the  adoption  of  truly  democratic  policies. 
So  they  also  set  about  to  strengthen  and  extend  the 
councils  and  committees  that  had  emerged  with 
the  revolution,  coordinating  them  in  conferences 
and  formal  congresses.  Much  of  the  activity  along 
these  lines  was  in  fact  of  a  constructive  character. 
But  class  and  party  considerations  were  always  in 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     33 

the  foreground  at  all  these  congresses.  Also  the 
constructive  socialists  did  not  accept  the  idea  of  a 
formal  coalition  at  the  beginning.  They  did  not 
participate  as  organizations  in  the  jBrst  govern- 
ment. Kerensky  was  a  socialist,  but  he  entered 
the  first  government  as  a  member  of  the  Duma, 
and  not  as  the  representative  of  the  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies. 

The  resolution  of  a  conference  of  the  Council 
of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies,  called  during 
the  fourth  week  of  the  revolution,  summarizes  the 
attitude  of  revolutionary  democracy  toward  the 
problem  of  the  moment.  The  full  text  of  the  reso- 
lution, given  in  a  literal  translation  to  preserve  as 
far  as  possible  the  style  of  the  original,  is  an  inter- 
esting document: 

"  AMiereas  the  Provisional  Government,  that 
was  brought  into  power  bj^  the  overthrow  of  the 
autocracy,  represents  the  interests  of  the  liberal 
and  democratic  bourgeoisie,  but  shows  a  tendency 
to  follow  the  right  line,  in  the  declaration  published 
by  it  in  agreement  with  the  representatives  of  the 
Council  of  W^orkmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies, 
therefore  the  all-Russian  Conference  of  Councils  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies,  while  insisting 
on  the  need  of  constant  pressure  being  brought  to 
bear  on  the  Provisional  Government  to  arouse  it 
to  the  most  energetic  struggle  with  the  counter- 
revolutionary forces,  and  to  decisive  measures  in 
the  direction  of  an  immediate  democratization  of 
the  entire  Russian  life,  nevertheless  recognizes  that 
political  expediency  dictates  support  of  the  Pro- 


34  FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

visional  Government  by  the  Council  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Deputies  so  long  as  the  Provisional 
Government,  in  agreement  with  the  Council, 
moves  inflexibly  toward  the  consolidation  of  the 
conquests  of  the  revolution  and  the  extension  of 
these  conquests." 

The  expression  "  so  long  as,"  emphasized  in  the 
translation  of  the  resolution,  has  been  one  of  the 
most  far-reaching  of  the  formulae  produced  by 
the  revolution.  Around  this  phrase  has  centered 
the  struggle  of  these  last  months.  The  extremists 
decided  from  the  very  start  that  the  condition  had 
not  been  fulfilled.  The  more  moderate  socialists 
took  an  attitude  of  constant  watchfulness,  and 
latent  distrust. 

"  Revolutionary  Democracy  "  could  not  be  or- 
ganized in  a  week  or  a  month,  so  for  the  first  period 
it  was  represented  by  the  revolutionary  democracy 
of  Petrograd,  through  the  Petrograd  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Deputies,  supplemented 
by  delegates  from  similar  councils  of  other  cities, 
and  by  representatives  from  the  army  at  the  front. 
It  was  more  difficult  to  organize  the  peasants  scat- 
tered through  the  country,  and  not  concentrated 
in  barracks  or  factories.  The  workmen  and  sol- 
diers of  Petrograd  therefore  assumed  to  represent 
all  revolutionary  democracy,  and  they  had  the 
physical  force  behind  them.  They  were  there  on 
the  spot,  at  the  administrative  and  political  center 
inherited  from  the  old  regime,  ready  to  act  without 
delay  when  they  decided  that  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment should  no  longer  be  supported.    And  the 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     35 

workmen  and  soldiers  of  Petrograd  were  being  won 
over  gradually  to  the  extremists,  the  Bolsheviki. 

As  the  Provisional  Government  was  aiming  first 
of  all  to  preserve  social  peace,  adopting  a  policy  of 
conciliation,  it  did  not  oppose  the  supervision  exer- 
cised by  the  Council.  In  fact  it  realized  that  only 
recognition  of  such  supervision  would  ensure  any 
measure  of  common  action.  The  Duma  commit- 
tee had  been  asked  to  efiface  itself,  for  as  an  institu- 
tion of  the  old  regime  it  aroused  the  suspicions  of 
the  revolutionary  bodies.  The  efficiency  of  the 
local  government  bodies  was  sacrificed  to  the  idea 
of  immediate  democratization.  The  establishment 
of  revolutionary  committees  all  over  the  country, 
and  in  the  army  even,  was  countenanced  and  ac- 
cepted, though  perhaps  only  because  it  was  seen 
that  it  could  not  be  prevented  except  by  repressive 
measures,  to  which  the  first  leaders  were  unwilling 
to  resort.  Perhaps  also  the  latter  realized  that 
physical  force  was  not  on  their  side. 

The  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Depu- 
ties acted  on  the  principle  of  a  direct  mandate  from 
the  whole  people.  It  issued  orders  to  revolutionary 
democracy,  as  we  saw.  It  insisted  on  the  exercise 
of  a  real  control,  even  on  the  right  to  countersign, 
as  it  were,  some  of  the  orders  of  the  Provisional 
Government.  Then  it  definitely  questioned  the 
policy  and  measures  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs and  the  Minister  of  War.  When  these  two 
men  were  forced  to  resign,  the  other  members  of 
the  government  demanded  that  revolutionary 
democracy  share  in  the  responsibility  of  govern- 


36  FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

ment,  if  it  insisted  on  such  a  measure  of  control. 
The  Councils  at  first  refused,  but  later  agreed,  and 
a  frankly  and  officially  recognized  coalition  gov- 
ernment was  formed.  Socialists  entered  the  gov- 
ernment not  only  as  members  of  their  respective 
parties,  but  as  representatives  of  revolutionary 
democracy  organized  in  the  Councils,  which  now 
contained  delegates  from  the  peasantry,  hurriedly 
brought  in  by  a  somewhat  artificial  system  of 
representation. 

The  first  Coalition  Government  drew  up  a  pro- 
gram of  policy.  As  this  program  was  somewhat 
vaguely  worded,  coalition  in  the  strict  and  true 
sense  of  the  word  was  not  secured.  The  socialists 
had  entered  the  coalition  under  pressure,  as  we  saw. 
Some  of  them  felt  called  upon  to  justify  the  step  in 
a  statement,  later  discovered  and  made  public,  to 
socialists  of  other  countries.  In  the  statement 
they  explained  that  they  had  entered  the  govern- 
ment, in  order  to  "  deepen  and  extend  the  class 
struggle."  And  this  is  what  some  of  them  did 
actually  start  in  to  do,  using  their  authority  and 
powers  as  ministers  to  turn  the  organs  of  revolu- 
tionary democracy  in  this  direction,  promoting 
suspicion  of  and  antagonism  toward  the  bour- 
geoisie. The  socialist  ministers  also  held  them- 
selves directly  responsible  to  the  Councils.  Finally 
the  socialist  members  of  the  government  tried  to 
force  immediate  decisions  on  questions  of  a  funda- 
mental nature,  which  should  be  decided  only  by 
the  Constituent  Assembly,  thus  not  adhering  to 
the  program  drawn  up  as  the  basis  for  the  coali- 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     37 

tion.  The  position  of  the  non-socialist  members  of 
the  government  therefore  became  untenable,  and 
a  whole  group  of  them  resigned. 

The  resignation  of  the  most  influential  bourgeois 
group  of  the  first  Coalition  Government  coincided 
quite  accidentally  with  an  armed  uprising  which 
the  extremists,  the  Bolsheviki,  had  been  planning 
for  several  weeks.  For  the  extremists  were  again 
putting  forward  their  demand,  this  time  supported 
by  armed  force,  that  all  the  "capitalist"  ministers 
resign,  and  that  all  authority  pass  into  the  hands 
of  the  Councils.  But  the  Councils  refused  to  take 
over  authority,  the  constructive  majority  replying 
that  they  would  not  accept  the  responsibility.  In 
their  judgment  only  a  government  representing 
all  the  vital  forces  of  the  country,  that  is  a  coali- 
tion government,  could  succeed.  The  moderate 
socialists  prevailed  in  the  Councils,  and  a  second 
coahtion  was  formed,  this  time  under  the  presi- 
dency of  a  socialist,  Kerensky.  Some  weeks 
elapsed  before  the  new  government  was  finally 
organized.  The  non-socialist  groups  were  willing 
to  enter  a  coalition  government  led  by  a  sociahst, 
but  only  on  a  definite  program,  which  would  ex- 
clude all  fundamental  legislation.  Objection  was 
raised  also  to  certain  individual  socialists,  whose 
record  in  the  first  coalition  government  made  one 
doubt  their  willingness  to  adhere  honestly  to  any 
coalition  program.  This  objection  was  withdrawn 
later;  but  the  non-socialists  gave  only  their  second- 
best  men  as  members  of  the  new  government. 
The  non-socialists  also  had  demanded  that  the 


38     FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

Provisional  Government  be  absolutely  independ- 
ent, its  members  not  responsible  to  any  councils  or 
party  committees.  For  the  Councils  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Deputies  were  as  we  saw  exclusively 
socialistic,  and  had  become  mere  party  bodies. 

In  the  meantime  the  democratization  of  local 
government  bodies  was  going  on  apace,  and  very 
successfully  in  view  of  the  chaotic  conditions  pro- 
duced by  revolution  and  war.  As  the  new  local 
municipal  and  provincial  councils,  elected  by  uni- 
versal suffrage,  began  to  convene,  the  revolutionary 
committees  and  councils  were  expected  gradually 
to  disappear.  The  elections  for  the  Constituent 
Assembly  were  to  take  place  as  soon  as  the  new 
local  governing  bodies  could  verify  and  correct  the 
lists  of  voters.  The  Constituent  Assembly  was  to 
replace  definitely  not  only  all  revolutionary  coun- 
cils and  committees,  but  also  the  Duma,  which 
continued  to  exist  legally,  though  without  func- 
tioning. The  main  objective  of  the  constructive 
elements  was  to  hold  the  situation  together  until 
the  Constituent  Assembly  could  be  convened;  the 
date  had  been  advanced,  even  at  a  sacrifice  of 
regularity  in  election  procedure.  And  a  coalition 
government  seemed  to  be  the  only  possible  solu- 
tion, despite  the  diflSculties  already  encountered 
in  applying  the  principle. 

The  councils,  the  land  committees  and  the  other 
organizations  that  had  come  into  existence  with 
and  in  the  course  of  the  revolution  were,  as  we  saw, 
almost  exclusively  socialist  in  their  political  affilia- 
tions.    This  was  true  even  of  the  peasant  con- 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION    39 

gresses,  though  it  was  generally  admitted  that  the 
bulk  of  the  peasantry  was  not  consciously  socialis- 
tic. Of  all  the  revolutionary  bodies  the  peasant 
councils  were  clearly  the  least  representative. 
This  was  particularly^  true  of  the  first  alleged  all- 
Russian  Peasant  Congress.  The  peasantry,  the 
great  mass  of  the  population,  became  articulate 
very  slowly.  The  non-socialist  groups  were  striv- 
ing to  bring  about  a  more  true  expression  of  peasant 
views;  and  their  moderate  program  was  making 
headway,  though  they  found  it  diflScult  to  compete 
with  the  extremists,  who  made  most  generous 
promises.  But  the  non-socialist  groups  were  be- 
ginning to  take  a  stronger  line,  as  they  saw  the 
experiments  of  the  extremists  lead  to  disillusion- 
ment. They  proposed  to  organize  councils  and  con- 
gresses of  the  non-socialist  elements.  This  project 
was  immediately  branded  as  counter-revolutionary 
by  "revolutionary  democracy."  Perhaps  to  ward 
off  the  contemplated  move  of  the  non-socialists, 
Kerensky  issued  a  general  invitation  for  a  state 
conference  at  Moscow  of  all  parties,  groups,  and 
organizations,  at  which  the  opinions  of  all  could 
be  expressed,  presumably  for  the  guidance  of  the 
Coalition  Government. 

The  Moscow  Conference  did  in  fact  give  to  all 
organizations,  Duma,  Councils  of  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Deputies,  the  recently  elected  local- 
government  bodies,  cooperative  and  professional 
unions,  in  fact  every  group,  socialist  and  non-so- 
cialist, revolutionary  and  pre-revolutionary  insti- 
tutions, the  opportunity  to  express  views.     The 


40  FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

speeches  did  perhaps  help  the  Coahtion  Govern- 
ment to  sense  the  situation  with  which  it  had  to 
deal,  though  the  Conference  showed  that  the  Coa- 
lition Government  was  unstable,  and  that  the 
extreme  ideas  of  the  Bolsheviki  had  penetrated 
deeply  in  the  broader  masses.  Again  the  Bolshe- 
viki attacked  the  principle  of  coalition,  and  de- 
manded that  revolutionary  democracy  take  over 
all  authority. 

Then  came  the  Kornilov  affair,  which  in  its  con- 
ception was  an  effort  on  the  part  of  the  constructive 
groups,  including  the  moderate  socialists,  to  dis- 
credit the  extremists,  and  establish  a  stronger  gov- 
ernment, free  from  party  ties  and  party  programs, 
representing  a  national  movement  to  organize  "  all 
the  vital  forces  of  the  country,"  to  use  again  the 
phraseology  of  the  revolution.  But  there  was  a 
misunderstanding,  and  also  perhaps  it  was  prema- 
ture —  "  revolutionary  democracy  "  was  not  yet 
suflSciently  sobered  to  accept  a  program  of  common 
constructive  effort.  The  movement  had  the  oppo- 
site effect;  it  split  the  country  into  two  openly 
hostile  camps,  and  brought  revolutionary  democ- 
racy still  more  under  the  influence  of  the  extrem- 
ists. The  Coalition  Government  fell  to  pieces, 
and  a  Directorate  of  Five,  with  almost  dicta- 
torial powers,  still  headed  by  Kerensky,  assumed 
authority. 

The  Bolsheviki  now  demanded  the  absolute  and 
final  renunciation  of  the  principle  of  coalition,  and 
the  formation  of  a  purely  socialistic  government. 
Kerensky  and  the  constructive  socialists  refused 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     41 

to  participate  in  such  a  government,  and  opened 
negotiations  with  the  non-sociahst  leaders,  to  at- 
tempt once  more  the  coahtion  form  of  government. 
The  extremists  then  sent  out  a  call  to  "  revolu- 
tionary democracy  "  to  meet  in  another  conference, 
which  they  called  a  Democratic  Conference,  as  op- 
posed to  the  State  Conference  of  Moscow.  They 
declared  that  no  bourgeois,  counter-revolutionary 
group  would  be  admitted  to  the  conference.  Ke- 
renskj^  allowed  the  conference  to  meet.  It  passed 
contradictory  resolutions,  first  voting  against  the 
principle  of  a  coalition  form  of  government,  but 
later  seeming  to  advocate  and  support  this  princi- 
ple. The  moderate  socialists  fought  hard  for  the 
coalition  idea,  and  Kerensky  and  his  followers 
seemed  at  last  to  have  won  out.  In  any  case,  at  the 
beginning  of  October,  Kerensky  formed  a  third 
coalition  government,  and  convened  a  prelimi- 
nary parliament  in  which  all  parties  were  repre- 
sented. This  time  a  definitely  outlined  program, 
as  the  basis  for  cooperation,  was  accepted  by  the 
socialists,  which  made  it  possible  for  the  non- 
socialists  to  give  their  best  men  to  the  new  combi- 
nation. The  Provisional  Government  of  October  8, 
at  least  the  fifth  since  the  revolution,  and  the  third 
Coalition  Government,  unquestionably  brought  to- 
gether the  strongest  and  most  representative  group 
of  men  since  the  revolution.  The  Bolsheviki  de- 
clared their  intention  to  break  it  up  as  quickly  as 
possible,  and  there  was  not  much  optimism  in  non- 
socialist  circles;  one  felt  that  it  would  not  survive 
many  weeks.     But  this  third  Coalition  Govern- 


42  FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION 

ment  gave  a  greater  promise  of  success  than  any 
previous  attempt.  There  was  hope  that  it  would 
last,  and  hold  the  situation  together,  at  least  until 
the  Constituent  Assembly  could  meet. 

This  hope  was  not  realized,  as  we  know,  and  the 
break-up  of  the  government  came  within  a  month, 
when  the  Bolsheviki  at  last  accomplished  their 
long-planned  armed  uprising,  and  by  force  estab- 
lished what  they  called  the  dictatorship  of  the  pro- 
letariat. Acting  on  the  very  eve  of  the  opening  of 
the  Constituent  Assembly,  the  elections  for  which 
were  already  in  progress,  the  Bolsheviki  showed 
clearly  their  contempt  for  a  really  national,  popular 
form  of  government.  The  Bolshevik  uprising  was 
followed  by  civil  war.  But  this  was  the  aim  of  the 
extremists,  for  they  were  against  social  peace,  co- 
operation, coalition,  and  were  striving  for  class  war. 

Until  this  last  month  the  Russian  Revolution, 
though  marked  by  extreme  antagonisms,  and  much 
wrangling,  was  nevertheless  comparatively  peace- 
ful in  character.  There  was  no  extensive  violence, 
such  as  would  justify  the  use  of  the  term  "  civil 
war."  It  was  to  avoid  civil  war  that  such  constant, 
and  on  the  whole  honest,  efforts  were  made  to 
"  unite  all  the  vital  forces  of  the  country."  For  it 
was  seen  that  civil  war  would  perhaps  ruin  the 
revolution,  and  in  any  case  would  eliminate  Russia 
as  a  factor  in  the  war,  and  the  constructive  leaders 
constantly  emphasized  that  on  the  successful  out- 
come of  the  war  depended  also  the  success  of  the 
revolution.  But  the  efforts  of  the  more  construc- 
tive and  moderate  groups  failed. 


FORCES  BEHIND  THE  REVOLUTION     43 

This  very  short  outline  of  the  attempts  to  solve 
the  problems  with  which  revolutionary  Russia  was 
confronted  by  applying  the  principle  of  coalition 
gives  an  interpretation  of  the  recent  events  in 
Russia  from  another  angle.  In  any  case  one  has 
tried  to  point  out  the  forces  in  conflict  during 
these  last  months,  perhaps  suggesting  one  of  many 
possible  issues  from  the  present  chaos. 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 


THE   RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

By  frank  ALFRED  COLDER 

THE  intelligent  public  that  has  been  watching 
the  erratic  courses  which  the  Russian  ship  of 
state  has  been  sailing  during  the  last  few  years  sus- 
pected that  something  was  wrong  with  it,  but  not 
until  after  the  March  revolution  did  it  become  fully 
known  what  incompetent  and  irresponsible  offi- 
cers were  in  command.  It  was  then  learned  that 
a  great  part  of  the  time  the  Emperor  was  either 
drunk  or  doped,  that  the  Empress  wa«  hysterical 
and  on  the  verge  of  a  mental  breakdown,  and  that 
they  were  assisted  by  senile  Sturmer,  mentally 
unbalanced  Protopopov,  and  profligate  Rasputin, 
none  of  whom  could  read  a  compass  nor  lay  out  a 
course  and  steered  the  ship  as  they  willed.  All  the 
passengers,  first,  second,  and  third  class,  grand 
dukes,  intelligentsia,  and  laborers  saw  the  danger 
and  shouted  warning  but  the  officers  neither  saw 
nor  heard.  In  order  to  save  themselves  and  the 
vessel  each  class  of  passengers,  quite  independent 
of  the  other,  resolved  that  at  the  first  opportune 
moment  it  would  throw  the  oflScers  overboard  and 
take  charge  of  the  ship;  but  while  they  were  plot- 
ting the  crew  mutinied,  arrested  the  oflScers,  and 
left  the  ship  to  drift  in  sight  of  the  breakers. 

Nicholas  Romanov  is  to  blame  for  the  plight  of 
his  country  and  for  his  own  misfortunes.    He  was 

47 


48  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

warned,  he  was  given  his  chances,  but  he  abused 
them  all.  When  he  entered  on  his  reign  he  was  pop- 
ular and  had  the  good  will  of  his  people  with  him. 
For  some  reason  or  other  it  was  assumed  that  he 
was  liberal  minded  and  that  under  him  the  people 
would  breathe  a  little  more  freely  than  under  his 
autocratic  father.  This  hope  was  so  strong  that  it 
was  unconsciously  accepted  as  a  fact.  Stories  were 
told  that  the  Tsar  fraternized  with  students  and 
workmen  and  that  he  was  determined  to  destroy 
the  bureaucratic  wall  which  kept  the  people  from 
him.  It  was  on  the  strength  of  this  report  that  the 
Zemstvo  of  Tver  petitioned  him  that  in  the  future 
it  might  have  direct  access  to  him  and  have  a  say 
in  the  government.  Here  was  a  great  opportunity 
but  he  turned  it  against  himself.  His  reply  was, 
"  It  has  come  to  my  attention  that  recently  some 
people  have  been  carried  away  by  senseless  dreams 
that  the  representatives  of  the  zemstvos  should 
take  part  in  internal  affairs.  Let  it  be  known  to  all 
that  I  shall  guard  the  autocracy  as  firmly  as  did 
my  father."  This  was  his  program  and  it  deeply 
disappointed  the  people.  On  the  top  of  this  came 
the  tragedy  at  Moscow  on  the  day  of  his  corona- 
tion when  hundreds  of  people  lost  their  lives  in  the 
attempt  to  obtain  a  loving  cup  which  was  promised 
them  in  commemoration  of  the  event.  Then  fol- 
lowed the  wholesale  killing  of  the  factory  hands  at 
laroslav,  of  the  peasants  in  Kharkov,  the  miners  on 
the  Lena,  and  other  such  massacres  and  pogroms. 
Nicholas  himself  withdrew  to  his  palaces  and  left 
the  affairs  of  state  in  the  hands  of  the  court  clique 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  49 

which  dragged  Russia  into  the  Japanese  war  and 
brought  on  the  revohition  of  1905.  Before  it  was 
over  the  Emperor  promised  a  constitution  but  as 
soon  as  the  disturbance  was  quelled  he  went  back 
on  his  word. 

It  was  known  that  he  was  weak  and  he  now 
proved  that  he  was  also  a  liar.  He  dismissed  one 
Duma  after  another,  he  created  an  upper  house  to 
act  as  a  brake,  he  juggled  with  the  electoral  laws 
so  that  whereas  according  to  the  law  of  December 
24,  1905  the  working  classes  and  the  peasants  were 
entitled  to  68  per  cent  of  the  Duma's  representa- 
tion, by  the  law  of  June  14,  1907  they  were  allowed 
only  36  per  cent,  Poland's  delegation  was  cut  down 
from  37  to  12  per  cent,  Caucasus'  from  29  to  9, 
Siberia's  from  21  to  14,  and  Central  Asia's  from  23 
to  1.  In  fact  he  did  everything  to  make  the  Duma 
ineffective  and  a  laughing  stock.  But  that  was  not 
enough,  his  pride  was  hurt  and  he  wanted  to  be  re- 
venged, and  the  number  of  people  arrested,  im- 
prisoned, exiled,  and  executed  for  political  crimes 
was  greater  than  before. 

It  has  been  said  that  Nicholas  was  not  cruel  and 
the  blame  for  the  bloody  deeds  in  his  reign  was  laid 
to  his  ministers.  Indeed,  there  is  something  in  his 
face  that  is  kindly  and  makes  a  very  good  first  im- 
pression. But  those  who  knew  him  better  had 
learned  to  distrust  that  smile.  When  the  Emperor 
was  most  gracious  to  one  of  his  ministers  it  was  a 
sign  that  his  resignation  would  be  called  for  the 
next  day.  In  this  respect  Nicholas  II  was  like 
Alexander  I.    The  following  story  tells  something 


50  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

of  the  real  character  of  the  man  who  had  the  lives 
of  millions  of  people  at  his  mercy.  The  committee 
appointed  by  the  Duma  to  take  charge  of  the 
papers  of  the  Tsar  found  that  many  important  doc- 
uments of  state,  such  as  reports  from  the  command- 
ers-in-chief, ministers,  and  others,  he  had  never 
read,  and  some  he  had  not  even  looked  at.  They 
did,  however,  come  across  a  notebook  which  had 
been  carefully  kept  and  guarded.  On  opening  it 
they  noted  that  Nicholas,  with  his  own  hand, 
wrote  down  the  names  of  those  revolutionists  who, 
in  1905-06,  were  executed,  the  kind  of  execution, 
and  other  such  details.^  That  interested  him,  but 
matters  of  state  he  left  to  his  time  servers,  to  his 
hysterical  wife,  yes,  to  Grigory  Rasputin,  a  dirty, 
ignorant,  and  licentious  peasant,  until  the  country 
blushed  with  shame  and  it  became  a  saying,  *'  Now 
we  have  Grigory  I  [Rasputin]  as  tsar." 

The  present  war  was  declared  by  the  Tsar  but  the 
people  approved  it  because  they  hoped  that  the  de- 
feat of  Germany  would  mean  the  defeat  of  the  Ger- 
man reactionary  influence  in  Russia,  especially 
about  the  court,  and  a  closer  union  with  democratic 
England  and  France.  I  was  present  at  the  capital 
at  the  time  that  the  war  broke  out  and  heard  the 
cheers  when  the  Emperor  made  the  declaration.  It 
seemed  as  if  Nicholas  by  coming  out  against  Ger- 
many had  redeemed  himself  in  the  eyes  of  his 
people  who  were  willing  to  wipe  out  the  past,  and 
give  him  another  chance.  During  the  first  months 
of  the  war  he  was  as  popular  as  during  the  first 

^  This  story  was  told  to  the  writer  by  a  member  of  the  committee. 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  51 

weeks  of  his  reign.  It  was  not  like  the  Japanese 
war  when  the  soldiers  refused  service;  in  this  Ger- 
man war,  the  men  called  to  colors  went  without  a 
murmur,  they  hoped  that  something  good  would 
come  out  of  it.  Offers  of  help  from  individuals  as 
well  as  commercial  and  civic  bodies  poured  in  on 
the  Government.  The  ministers  said  that  every- 
thing was  ready,  that  in  a  few  months  the  Russians 
would  be  in  Berlin.  At  first,  all  went  well,  but  soon 
news  came  of  the  catastrophe  in  eastern  Prussia, 
of  the  traitorous  acts  of  the  Minister  of  War,  of  the 
campaign  in  the  Carpathians  where  the  Russians 
were  slaughtered  like  sheep  because  they  had  no 
guns,  no  ammunition,  and  no  supplies.  Again  the 
poor  people  were  betrayed  and  a  cry  of  horror  and 
vengeance  went  up  as  on  January  9,  1905,  Bloody 
Sunday.  The  Tsar  would  probably  have  been  over- 
thrown there  and  then  had  it  not  been  for  the  war 
and  the  hatred  of  Germany.  The  liberals  and 
patriots  of  all  kinds  thought  that  all  was  not  yet 
lost  and  they  went  to  work  with  a  will,  giving  them- 
selves, their  money,  their  strength,  and  their  lives, 
but  they  soon  became  convinced  that  it  was  all  in 
vain  so  long  as  Rasputin,  the  Empress,  and  their 
clique  ran  the  government.'  Through  the  Duma 
they  begged  the  Emperor  to  put  in  ministers  whom 
the  people  could  trust,  but  he,  as  if  to  show  his  con- 
tempt for  public  opinion,  selected  men  of  low  char- 

1  Several  months  before  the  revolution  the  following  confidential 
conversation  took  place  between  Alexeiev,  the  Russian  commander- 
in-chief,  and  a  journalist: 

Alexeiev:   I  can  get  nothing  from  them  [ministers].    My  sup- 
plies are  decreasing.  ...     It  is  even  necessary  to  think 


52  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

acter,  one  worse  than  the  other,  men  with  whom 
even  decent  monarchists  would  not  shake  hands, 
and  in  shame  withdrew  from  court. ^    The  members 

about  bread.    We  are  already  cutting  down  the  allowance. 
They  have  forgotten  about  food  for  the  horses.  .  .  . 

Journalist  :  What  are  you  going  to  do  about  it  ? 

A.  What  shall  I  do  ?  With  these  people  there  is  nothing  that 
can  be  done. 

J.     Have  you  said  anything  to  the  Tsar  about  it  ? 

A.     I  have  .  .  .  but  it  does  no  good. 

J.     Why? 

A.  WTiile  you  talk  to  him  he  pays  attention,  gets  worked  up,  is 
eager  to  do  something  .  .  .  but  as  soon  as  he  leaves  you  he 
forgets  about  it.  All  kinds  of  pressure  are  brought  to  bear 
upon  him,  he  is  not  a  free  man. 

J.      Is  it  true  that  the  Tsarina  has  much  influence  ? 

A.  It  is  only  too  true.  Her  influence  is  irresistible.  What  is 
worse  she  never  comes  out  in  the  open.  She  interferes  with 
everybody,  but  works  behind  their  backs.  You  never  can 
tell  what  she  will  do  next.  Every  time  she  comes  here  she 
makes  new  trouble. 

J.     Do  the  ministers  ever  consult  you  .'' 

A.  They  come,  they  talk.  What  can  they  do  ?  The  honest 
ministers  leave  and  the  worthless  remain.  ...  If  it  were 
not  for  the  war  I  would  resign  too.  If  I  should  leave  what 
would  not  they  do  with  the  army  .'  Do  I  not  understand 
that  Sturmer  and  Company  are  thinking  only  of  an  alliance 
with  Germany  ?  .  .  .  The  home  situation  is  serious.  They 
[ministers]  are  purposely  instigating  hunger  disturbances  in 
order  to  provoke  a  revolution  so  as  to  have  an  excuse  for 
breaking  away  from  the  Allies  and  end  the  war.  Oiu:  army 
is  now  in  condition  to  crush  Germany  and  without  that  there 
can  be  no  real  peace  in  Europe.  But  a  permanent  peace  is 
not  wanted  by  Sturmer  and  Protopopov,  they  wish  to  keep 
the  people  under  the  heel  of  a  strong  Germany.  Apart  from 
the  Germans  no  one  will  protect  them  from  the  revolution. 
The  pity  of  it  all  is  that  at  the  head  of  the  government  there 
still  are  men  who  are  interested  in  crushing  the  people. 
^  Princess  Vasilchikov,  a  prominent  court  lady,  became  convinced 
that  the  Empress  and  her  ministers  were  ruining  the  country  and  there- 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  53 

of  the  royal  family  '  and  the  grand  dukes  -  urged 
the  Tsar  to  change  his  course  and  not  ruin  the  coun- 

fore  %\Tote  her  a  courteous  letter,  pleading  with  her  to  save  Russia. 
For  her  pains  she  received  an  order  to  retire  to  her  estate,  and  her 
husband,  who  held  a  very  prominent  position,  left  the  capital  with  her. 
{Novoe  Vremia,  March  11-24,  1917.) 

1  As  late  as  October,  1916,  the  old  Empress  saw  her  son  at  Kiev  and 
pointed  to  him  that  Rasputin  and  the  other  members  of  the  court 
circle  would  overthrow  the  dynasty  and  destroy  the  country  but  it  did 
no  good.  Only  a  few  days  before  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  his 
own  brother,  Mikhail  Alexandrovich,  pleaded  with  him  along  the 
same  lines  and  with  the  same  success.    (Rech,  March  7-20,  1917.) 

-  The  old  and  scholarlj-  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  MikhaUovich  went 
to  see  the  Emperor  about  November  1,  1916,  and  in  order  to  impress 
him  with  the  critical  situation  of  the  country  he  wrote  out  his  ideas  so 
as  to  leave  them.  He  was  received  in  a  kindly  manner  by  the  Tsar 
who  listened  to  the  reading  of  the  letter  and  then  took  it  over  so  as  to 
read  it  to  the  Empress.  When  he  came  to  the  place  where  her  name 
was  mentioned  she  snatched  it  from  him  and  tore  it  up.  In  the  course 
of  the  conversation  that  followed  the  old  Duke  said  some  sharp  things 
but  he  could  not  get  anything  but  smiles  from  the  Tsar,  and  when  the 
old  man's  cigarette  went  out  the  Tsar  lighted  it  for  him.  It  was  im- 
possible to  get  an  out  and  out  talk,  or  satisfaction  of  any  kind,  and 
Nicholas  Mikhailovich  left  the  court  in  disgust.  Two  days  later  he 
was  requested  to  retire  to  his  estate  for  two  months.  Here  is  the 
Grand  Duke's  letter: 

"  You  have  said  more  than  once  that  you  would  carry  on  the  war 
to  a  successful  finish.  Do  you  believe  that  with  the  conditions  as  they 
exist  at  present  in  the  rear  this  can  be  done  ?  Are  you  acquainted 
with  the  internal  situation,  not  only  in  the  interior  of  the  Empire  but 
also  on  the  outskirts  (Siberia,  Turkestan,  Caucasus)  ?  Are  you  told 
all  the  truth  or  is  some  of  it  concealed  from  you  ?  Where  is  the  root 
of  the  evil  ?    Allow  me  to  tell  you  briefly  the  essentials  of  the  case. 

"  So  long  as  yom-  method  of  selecting  ministers  was  known  to  a 
limited  circle  only  affairs  went  on  somehow,  but  from  the  moment 
your  system  became  generally  known  it  is  stupid  to  govern  Russia  in 
that  way.  Repeatedly  you  have  told  me  that  you  could  trust  no  one, 
that  you  were  being  deceived.  If  that  is  true  then  the  same  influences 
are  at  work  on  your  wife,  dearly  beloved  by  you,  who  is  led  astray  by 


54  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

try  and  the  dynasty  but  he,  drugged  ^  by  Dr.  Bad- 
maev  and  duped  by  Rasputin,  Protopopov  and 

the  evil  circle  that  surrounds  her.  You  trust  Alexandra  Fedorovna  — 
that  is  easy  to  understand.  But  that  which  comes  out  of  her  mouth  is 
the  result  of  clever  fabrication  and  not  the  truth.  If  you  are  not 
strong  enough  to  remove  these  influences  from  her,  at  least  put  your- 
self on  guard  against  this  steady  and  systematic  interference  of  those 
who  act  through  your  beloved.  If  yom-  persuasion  is  ineffective,  and 
I  am  certain  that  you  have  more  than  once  fought  against  this  influ- 
ence, try  some  other  means  so  as  to  end  with  this  system  once  for  all. 
Yoiu-  first  impulses  and  decisions  are  always  unusually  true  and  to  the 
point,  but  as  soon  as  another  influence  comes  in  you  begin  to  hesitate 
and  end  up  by  doing  something  different  from  what  you  originally 
decided.  If  you  should  succeed  in  removing  this  continuous  invasion 
of  the  dark  forces  there  would  take  place  at  once  the  birth  of  a  new 
Russia,  and  there  would  return  to  you  the  confidence  of  the  greater 
number  of  your  subjects.  All  other  matters  would  soon  settle  them- 
selves. You  would  find  people  who  imder  different  conditions  would 
be  willing  to  work  under  your  personal  leadership.  At  the  proper 
time,  and  that  is  not  far  distant,  you  can  of  your  own  free  will  organ- 
ize a  ministry  which  should  be  responsible  to  you  and  to  constitu- 
tional institutions.  This  can  be  done  very  simply,  without  any  force 
from  outside  as  was  the  case  with  the  act  of  October  17,  1905.  I  hesi- 
tated a  long  time  before  venturing  to  tell  you  this  truth,  and  I  finally 
consented  when  your  mother  and  sister  urged  me  to  do  so.  You  are 
at  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  of  disturbances,  I  will  go  farther,  at  the 
beginning  of  a  new  era  of  attempts  at  assassination.  Believe  me  that 
in  trying  to  loosen  you  from  the  chains  that  bind  you  I  do  it  from  no 
motives  of  personal  interest  and  of  this  you  and  Her  Majesty  are  con- 
vinced, but  in  the  hope  and  in  the  expectation  of  saving  you,  your 
throne,  and  our  dear  native  land  from  some  very  serious  and  irrep- 
arable consequences."     {Rech,  March  9-22,  1917.) 

1  "  An  important  role  was  played  at  coiu:t  by  Dr.  Badmaev,  Ras- 
putin's friend.  There  were  many  rumors  afloat  in  court  and  it  is  diflB- 
ciJt  to  tell  the  truth.  But  this  I  can  say  that  Nicholas  Alexandrovich 
was  drugged  with  different  drugs  from  Thibet.  In  this  Rasputin  took 
part.  During  the  last  days  they  brought  the  Emperor  to  a  state  of 
almost  total  insanity  and  his  will  power  was  completely  gone.  In  all 
matters  of  state  he  consulted  the  Empress  who  led  him  to  the  edge  of 
the  precipice."  Interview  given  out  by  Prince  lusupov,  in  Novoe 
Vremia,  March  14-27,  1917. 


THE  RUSSL\N  REVOLUTION  55 

Company,  sent  them  all  out  of  the  capital  with 
orders  not  to  return  until  sent  for.  They  became 
so  desperate  that  they  murdered  Rasputin  but  the 
Empress  remained  ^  and  the  government  policy  be- 
came more  reactionary  than  ever  and  as  Prince 
lusupov  said  the  country  was  drifting  to  destruc- 
tion or  to  a  state  of  anarchy.  It  was  quite  evident 
that  the  only  way  to  save  the  country  was  through 
a  revolution  and  it  was  merely  a  question  whether  it 
would  come  first  from  the  top  or  from  the  bottom  ^ 
and  when. 

It  is  only  since  the  political  upheaval  that  the 
activities  and  plans  of  the  grand  dukes  have  be- 
come public,  but  the  cry  for  a  revolution  on  the 
part  of  the  great  mass  of  intelligent  people  was 
heard  before  and  everywhere.  On  my  return  to 
Russia,  in  February,  1916,  after  an  absence  of  a 
little  more  than  two  years,  I  noticed  many  changes 
but  none  greater  than  in  the  public  opinion  in  re- 
gard to  the  administration.  On  the  way  across 
Siberia,  I  met  with  many  Russians,  some  of  whom 

1  One  of  the  editors  of  the  Novoe  Vremia  who  has  large  acquaint- 
ance in  the  aristocratic  circles  of  the  capital  told  the  wTiter  that  for 
months  before  the  revolution  it  was  commonly  talked  about  in  the 
homes  of  military  leaders  and  fashionable  circles  that  for  the  good  of 
Russia  the  Empress  must  be  kUled.  Last  fall  (1916)  there  came  to  his 
home  one  of  his  friends,  an  aide-de-camp  of  one  of  the  grand  dukes, 
and  confided  to  him  that  he  was  meditating  an  act  of  terrorism  in 
order  to  get  a  certain  person  out  of  the  way.  Another  topic  of  con- 
versation was  the  revolution  after  the  war. 

^  "  I  will  say  this  —  at  court  there  reigned  a  kind  of  nightmare, 
each  day  fewer  and  fewer  people  remained  there.  If  the  revolution 
had  not  broken  out  from  the  bottom  it  would  have  from  the  top." 
Interview  given  out  by  Prince  lusupov,  in  Novoe  Vremia,  March  14- 
27,  1917. 


5Q  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

were  army  officers,  and  one  and  all  bitterly  criti- 
cized the  government  for  its  mismanagement  of  the 
war,  for  the  betrayal  of  Russia  as  they  called  it,  for 
its  incompetency,  and  general  worthlessness.  At 
the  capital,  it  was  the  same,  everywhere,  street, 
car,  and  public  places,  the  government  was  de- 
nounced; there  was  no  attempt  at  concealment. 
In  the  archives  where  I  worked,  which  are  almost 
under  the  very  nose  of  the  imperial  family,  the  criti- 
cism was  as  open  as  in  private  homes.  In  fact  there 
was  no  exception.  When  mention  was  made  of  the 
Court,  of  Rasputin,  and  of  the  Empress,  there  was 
a  kind  of  a  painful  smile;  it  was  not  a  subject  that 
self-respecting  patriotic  Russians  liked  to  talk 
about  in  public  or  before  strangers;  it  was  like 
dirty  linen  that  ought  not  to  be  hung  out  for  public 
view. 

There  was  reason  enough  and  suffering  enough 
to  justify  the  complaining.  Petrograd  was  over- 
crowded owing  to  the  thousands  of  refugees  who 
had  been  driven  there,  rooms  and  apartments 
were  difficult  to  find  and  very  expensive,  and  the 
cost  of  living  had  gone  up  so  high  that  it  was 
hard  for  the  poor  to  make  ends  meet.  It  was  al- 
most impossible  to  get  about  in  the  city,  as  the  war 
had  reduced  the  number  of  cabs  and  the  few  that 
did  business  asked  such  exorbitant  fares  that  only 
the  rich  could  afford  to  ride  in  them.  The  street 
car  situation  was  in  a  hopeless  tangle.  Even  before 
the  war  there  were  not  enough  accommodations  for 
the  public,  but  since  the  opening  of  hostilities  many 
of  the  cars  had  broken  down  and  there  were  no  me- 


THE  RUSSI.\N  REVOLUTION  57 

chanics  to  repair  them  and  no  new  cars  to  replace 
them.  At  a  time  when  the  popuhition  increased, 
the  transportation  facihties  decreased.  Passengers 
poured  into  the  cars  like  a  stream,  filled  the  seats, 
blocked  the  aisles,  jammed  the  entrance,  stood  on 
the  steps,  hung  on  behind,  and  clung  to  anything 
that  might  bear  them  along.  Dij95cult  as  it  was  to 
get  into  the  car,  it  was  worse  to  get  out,  and  it  is 
easier  to  imagine  than  to  describe  the  pushing, 
swearing,  tearing,  and  fighting  that  one  witnessed. 
The  railways  were  in  an  equally  bad  condition. 
One  had  to  wait  weeks  for  a  ticket.  Men  and 
women  were  crowded  into  the  same  coupes;  the 
cars  were  packed  so  full  of  human  beings  that  they 
suggested  cattle  cars,  except  that  they  were  not  so 
sanitary,  for  they  contained  people  suffering  from 
contagious  diseases  and  were  without  fresh  air. 

The  food  situation  was  very  serious.  For  many 
years,  Russia  had  been  the  granary  of  Europe  but 
during  the  winter  of  1916-17  suffered  from  shortage 
of  food.  Passengers  told  how  in  southern  Russia 
grain  and  flour  were  rotting  and  yet  in  northern 
Russia  the  inhabitants  were  starving  owing  to  the 
breakdown  of  the  transportation  system.  It  was 
pointed  out  that  while  the  railway  oflScials  refused 
to  give  cars  for  bringing  in  the  necessities  of  life, 
yet  articles  of  luxury,  expensive  fruits,  and  such 
things  did  come  into  the  city  —  a  state  of  affairs 
which  meant,  of  course,  that  some  one  was  grafting. 
Sugar  could  be  obtained  only  by  cards  and  in  very 
limited  quantities;  flour  could  not  be  bought  at 
all,  and  black,  sour  bread  could  often  be  had  only 


58  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

by  standing  in  long  lines  and  for  hours  at  a  time. 
There  were  no  shoes  and  people  asked  what  became 
of  the  hides  of  the  thousands  of  animals  that  were 
annually  slaughtered  and  shot.  It  was  said  that 
these,  like  other  things,  were  sold  to  Germany. 

As  usual  the  poorer  classes  suffered  the  most. 
The  well-to-do  sent  their  servants  who  after  a  time 
returned  with  bread;  at  the  worst  it  was  only  an 
inconvenience,  but  the  workman  had  no  servants 
to  run  his  errands.  In  the  morning,  the  laborer  left 
his  home  for  his  work  with  little  or  no  breakfast,  at 
noon  there  was  no  luncheon  for  him  because  his 
wife  was  standing  in  the  bread  or  sugar  line,  and 
when  he  returned  in  the  evening  there  may  have 
been  bread  enough  but  little  else.  The  wife  was 
tired  and  discouraged,  the  children  crying  and  hun- 
gry, and  life  became  a  burden. 

We  may  say  that  the  conditions  in  Russia  were 
no  worse  than  in  France  or  Germany.  This  is 
doubtless  true,  but  there  is  this  difference:  the 
people  of  France  and  Germany  had  confidence  in 
their  leaders  and  realized  that  they  were  doing  the 
best  that  they  could,  while  the  Russians  knew  they 
could  put  no  trust  in  their  Government,  that  the 
suffering  was  unnecessary  and  was  due  to  corrup- 
tion, favoritism,  and  incompetency.  The  Russians 
have  as  much  patriotism  and  patience  as  any  other 
people,  but  when  they  saw  themselves  abused  and 
imposed  upon  they  had  a  right  to  complain. 

In  addition  to  the  criticism  of  the  Government 
the  other  favorite  topic  of  conversation  was  the 
revolution  that  would  come  after  the  war.    This 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  59 

was  discussed  as  openly  as  the  problems  of  war; 
the  two  were  bound  up  together,  first  a  successful 
ending  of  the  war,  and  then  a  change  in  govern- 
ment. 

This  public  denunciation  and  open  discussion  of 
a  coii^  d'etat  came  as  a  shock  to  me,  for  I  remem- 
bered quite  vividly  how  the  same  people  cheered 
the  Emperor  when  he  declared  war.  Three  years 
ago  no  one  would  have  dared  to  talk  like  that.  To 
be  sure  enough  was  said  then  of  the  desirability  of 
a  more  liberal  government,  but  it  was  a  far-off 
question,  one  that  the  next  generation  might  have 
to  deal  with.  Now  the  talk  was  of  an  overturn  im- 
mediately after  the  war. 

The  court  circle  was  not  ignorant  of  what  was 
being  said  for  the  spies  kept  them  fully  informed. 
In  conversation  with  a  journalist  two  months  be- 
fore the  outbreak  of  the  revolution,  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  Protopopov,  a  protege  of  Rasputin, 
said  that  he  was  aware  of  the  revolutionary  propa- 
ganda and  that  he  was  ready  to  face  any  attempt 
that  might  be  made  to  overthrow  the  government. 
"  I  will  not  stop  at  anything,"  he  remarked,  .  .  . 
"  the  first  thing  that  I  shall  do  is  to  send  them  [rev- 
olutionaries] from  the  capital  by  the  car  loads. 
But  I  will  strangle  the  revolution  no  matter  what 
the  cost  may  be."  ^  He  had  no  doubt  that  he  could 
handle  the  situation  and  he  inspired  those  about 
him  with  the  same  confidence,  particularly  the 
Emperor  whom  he  assured  that  the  discontent  was 
confined  chiefly  to  the  intelligentsia  and  to  a  small 

1  Novoe  Vremia,  March  19-April  1,  1917. 


60  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

number  of  the  gentry,  and  that  the  common  people 
and  the  army  were  devoted  to  the  autocracy. 

To  the  question  that  arises  why  the  revolution, 
which  was  expected  after  the  war,  came  off  before 
its  conclusion,  the  answer  is  that  the  present  revo- 
lution was  not  planned  nor  desired  by  any  one  of 
importance;  it  came  as  a  surprise  to  all.  It  just 
happened.  If  some  one  must  have  the  credit  or 
blame,  it  is  Protopopov  who  was  at  the  time  sus- 
pected of  being  queer  mentally  and  who  has  since 
lost  his  reason  entirely.  He  was  so  sure  of  himself 
and  of  his  ability  to  put  down  the  uprising  and 
thereby  show  himself  a  real  statesman  that  he  con- 
cluded not  to  wait  for  the  revolution  to  come  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  events,  but  to  hurry  it  a  bit. 
Although  there  is  no  conclusive  proof  for  this  state- 
ment, there  is  plenty  of  convincing  circumstantial 
evidence.  We  know  that  it  was  proposed  to  have 
the  workmen  of  Petrograd  strike  on  February  27, 
the  day  of  the  opening  of  the  Duma,  as  a  protest 
against  the  government;  we  know  also  that  to 
meet  this  situation,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  had 
placed  machine  guns  in  the  garrets,  in  steeples,  on 
housetops,  and  other  such  places  where  they  could 
command  the  important  streets  and  shoot  down 
the  mob.  The  rising  did  not  take  place  because 
Miliukov,  the  great  liberal  leader,  learned  that  the 
Government  was  behind  this  move  and  that  prepa- 
rations had  been  made  to  slaughter  the  unsuspect- 
ing workmen.  He,  therefore,  addressed  them  in  an 
open  letter  calling  on  them  not  to  make  any  dem- 
onstration, and  they  did  not.    For  the  time  being 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  61 

the  strike  was  off,  but  the  air  was  full  of  discontent 
and  restlessness,  and  it  was  difficult  to  say  when 
trouble  would  break  out  again.  With  this  in  view, 
a  number  of  representatives  of  various  organiza- 
tions met  to  discuss  the  situation  and  to  determine 
what  attitude  they  should  take  and  what  counsel 
they  should  give  to  the  labor  leaders.  Miliukov 
and  a  few  others  urged  that  all  uprisings  should  be 
discouraged  because  they  would  interfere  with  the 
war,  would  cost  the  lives  of  many  innocent  persons, 
and  would  accomplish  nothing.  There  were,  how- 
ever, others,  especially  Anisimov,  who  argued 
strongly  in  favor  of  a  strike,  saying  that  this  was 
the  opportune  time  to  overthrow  the  present 
regime  and  to  establish  a  democratic  government.' 
When  the  revolution  came  off  and  the  papers  of 
the  secret  police  were  seized,  it  was  discovered  that 
Anisimov,  who  urged  the  revolt,  was  the  paid  agent 
of  the  Government  and  was  doubtless  doing  its 
bidding.  This  shows  that  the  Government  insti- 
gated and  abetted  the  uprising.  But  this  is  not  all 
the  evidence.  Between  February  27  and  the  out- 
break of  the  revolution  men  impersonating  Miliu- 
kov went  to  the  factories,  calling  on  the  workmen 
to  rise  against  the  Government.'  There  is  still 
another  bit  of  evidence.  In  order  to  give  the  labor- 
ing classes  cause  for  revolt,  the  food  supply  in  the 
factory  districts  was  reduced  and  many  people 
suffered  from  hunger  and  in  their  desperation  came 
out  into  the  streets.  During  the  revolutionary 
week  little,  if  any,  food  came  in,  but  immediately 

1  I  have  this  story  from  Miliukov. 


62  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

after  it  the  soldiers  found  250,000  "puds"  of 
jEour,'  enough  to  last  Petrograd  ten  days,  meat,  be- 
sides other  food  hidden  in  police  stations  and  else- 
where out  of  reach  of  the  public.  It  has  been  said 
that  the  Government  instigated  the  uprising  in 
order  to  bring  about  a  separate  peace  with  Ger- 
many. No  direct  proof  has  as  yet  been  produced 
to  substantiate  this  charge,  and  the  only  testimony 
that  I  have  bearing  on  this  case  is  the  statement 
made  by  commander-in-chief  Alexeiev  in  a  confi- 
dential interview  with  a  journalist  already  quoted. ^ 
These  four  points  —  the  encouragement  of  a 
revolt  by  the  secret  agents,  the  impersonation  of 
Miliukov,  the  concealment  of  food  in  the  factory 
districts,  the  desire  of  a  separate  peace  with  Ger- 
many —  make  out  a  fairly  good  case  to  show 
that  the  Government  was  behind  the  disturbance. 
Aside  from  the  reason  already  given  for  the  desire 
of  a  separate  peace,  the  other  reason  for  the  action 
of  the  ministry  was  this :  It  feared  that  the  revolu- 
tionary movement,  if  permitted  to  take  its  natural 
course,  would  develop  such  strength  that  it  could 
not  be  put  down  when  it  broke  out,  and,  therefore, 

1  Russkaia  Svoboda,  1917.    No.  3,  p.  24. 

2  There  is  not  the  least  bit  of  evidence  to  show  that  the  Emperor 
himself  was  mixed  up  in  these  intrigues.  Among  the  papers  of  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  there  is  but  one  document  that  throws 
any  light  on  the  question  of  a  separate  peace  during  the  time  of  the 
monarchy.  It  is  a  letter  from  the  minister  of  the  German  Court  to 
the  minister  of  the  Russian  Court  insinuating  a  separate  peace.  This 
letter  was  shown,  as  was  intended,  to  the  Tsar,  who  read  it,  put  it 
aside,  and  did  not  answer  it.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that 
Sturmer,  Protopopov  and  the  clique  of  the  Empress  were  not  planning 
to  bring  about  a  situation  which  would  compel  a  separate  peace. 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  63 

the  Minister  of  the  Interior  decided  to  take  it  in 
hand  and  at  the  right  moment  crush  it  with  such 
force  that  it  would  be  a  long  time  before  it  could 
raise  its  head  again.  Before  it  was  over  he  hoped 
to  drag  in  prominent  members  of  the  Duma  (or  the 
Duma  itself)  and  other  revolutionary  leaders,  and 
make  an  end  of  them.  This  plan  need  not  astonish 
us,  for  this  method,  in  one  form  or  another,  had 
been  made  use  of  by  the  autocracy  time  and  again. 
Protopopov  overreached  himself,  his  scheme  mis- 
carried, the  soldiers  about  the  capital  went  back  on 
him,  and  the  little  comedy  that  he  had  staged  in 
which  he  was  to  play  the  leading  part  became  a 
tragedy  and  the  shot  which  was  intended  for  the 
revolution  hit  his  royal  master  and  brought  autoc- 
racy to  the  ground.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  Pro- 
topopov has  since  become  insane,  one  wonders 
whether  the  man  was  mentally  well  balanced  at 
the  time  that  he  was  in  office.  But  the  Tsar  has 
only  himself  to  blame  for  his  plight;  he  was  warned 
against  this  nominee  of  Rasputin,  but  he  would 
not  take  advice. 

Early  in  the  week  of  March  5-U,  1917,  the 
trouble  began  in  the  factory  districts.  There  were 
bread  riots,  car  stoning,  window  smashing,  and 
other  such  acts,  which  are  more  or  less  common 
and  no  one  paid  much  attention  to  them.  On 
Thursday,  the  disturbances  spread  to  other  parts 
of  the  city  and  crowds  began  to  gather  on  the  Nev- 
ski,  but  the  throng  was  orderly  and  the  police 
seemed  to  have  little  difficulty  in  keeping  it  on  the 
move. 


64  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

Friday  the  crowd  was  more  bold :  it  marched  up 
and  down  the  streets,  calling  for  bread,  singing 
revolutionary  songs,  and  occasionally  waving  a  red 
flag  and  quickly  snatching  it  back  again.  This, 
too,  did  not  make  much  impression  for  it  is  well 
known  that  in  Russia  strikes  and  disturbances 
have  in  view  political  as  well  as  economic  better- 
ment. Late  Friday  afternoon,  while  I  was  walking 
on  the  Nevski,  a  company  of  mounted  police  and  a 
large  number  of  Cossacks  dashed  by  on  the  way  to 
disperse  a  procession  that  was  coming  towards  me. 
When  I  came  up  to  the  Fontanka  Bridge  I  noticed 
the  crowd  was  gathered  about  the  Cossacks;  it 
patted  the  horses  and  cheered  their  riders,  while 
the  police  were  nowhere  in  sight.  I  listened  to 
what  was  being  said  and  heard  that  the  police  tried 
to  use  their  whips  and  swords  on  the  people  and 
this  angered  the  Cossacks  so  much  that  they  at- 
tacked the  police,  killed  the  captain,  and  drove 
them  all  away.  It  was  no  secret  that  there  was 
bad  blood  between  the  soldiers  and  the  police;  the 
former  complained  that  while  they  were  suffering 
and  fighting  at  the  front,  the  latter  were  having  an 
easy  time,  enriching  themselves  by  graft,  and  op- 
pressing the  soldiers'  families.  The  soldiers  and 
the  strikers  started  out  with  one  idea  —  hatred  of 
the  police.  When  the  police  had  been  dispersed, 
the  Cossacks  and  soldiers  begged  the  people  to 
move  on,  but  they,  especially  the  young  women 
students  who  were  numerous,  went  up  to  them  and 
pleaded  with  them  to  espouse  their  cause.  "  Com- 
rades," they  would  say,  "  come  over  on  our  side, 


THE  RUSSL\N  REVOLUTION  65 

our  cause  is  your  cause."  The  rough,  ignorant  war- 
riors were  disturbed;  they  did  not  hke  their  jobs, 
and  in  a  kindly  way  begged  the  men  and  women 
to  go  home,  but,  as  it  did  no  good,  for  they  massed 
again,  the  Cossacks  rode  in  a  body  into  their  midst 
and  kept  turning  and  turning  until  the  crowd  was 
forced  from  the  street  onto  the  sidewalk.  In  the 
meantime,  another  company  of  Cossacks  formed  a 
line  across  the  street,  from  wall  to  wall,  and  swept 
everybody  before  it  into  stores,  courtyards,  and 
other  openings.  Even  this  did  not  do  much  good, 
for  as  soon  as  the  horsemen  passed,  the  mob  fell  in 
behind  and  cheered  the  Cossacks.  There  was  no 
roughness,  but  at  the  same  time  it  was  easy  to  see 
that  the  crowd  did  not  yet  know  to  what  extent  the 
army  could  be  trusted. 

By  Saturday  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  began  to 
feel  the  effect  of  the  disorder;  cars  were  not  run- 
ning, telephones  were  barely  working,  factories 
and  shops  were  closed,  banks  and  stores  were 
locked,  there  was  little  to  eat,  for  the  only  provi- 
sion on  hand  was  water;  every  one  who  could  filled 
the  tubs  for  fear  the  water  mains  would  be  blown 
up.  The  crowd  on  the  streets  was  larger  than  ever, 
more  red  flags  were  in  evidence,  but  all  this  failed 
to  give  the  impression  of  a  revolution.  Such  dem- 
onstrations had  been  seen  before;  revolutionary 
talk  was  cheap  and  was  not  taken  seriously.  As 
on  the  day  before,  the  soldiers  and  Cossacks  tried 
by  gentle  means  to  disperse  the  crowd,  but  failed, 
for  the  men  and  women  in  the  crowd  complained 
that  they  were  hungry  and  pleaded  with  the  mili- 


66  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

tary  for  the  sake  of  their  own  families  to  stand  by 
the  people.  It  was  easy  to  see  that  these  guardians 
of  the  peace  were  in  trouble,  they  knew  that  every 
word  said  was  true,  and  what  was  more  to  the 
purpose,  members  of  their  own  families  were  in  the 
crowd.  An  oflScer  who  was  sent  with  his  company 
to  shoot  on  the  people  told  how  that  same  morning 
his  own  sister  took  part  in  the  demonstration  and 
called  for  bread  for  her  children.  This  was  no  ex- 
ceptional case.  But  as  soldiers  they  must  do  their 
duty  and  keep  order.  Realizing  that  the  strata- 
gems of  the  day  before  failed  in  their  purpose,  the 
Cossacks  tried  other  tactics  on  this  day.  They  fell 
behind  the  procession,  and  discharged  their  pistols 
in  the  air  and  dashed  at  full  speed  into  the  mob. 
Woe  unto  him  who  did  not  get  out  of  the  way. 
But  they  all  did;  in  a  second  there  was  not  a  person 
on  the  street.  It  is  still  a  wonder  how  it  was  all 
done  so  quickly.  As  soon  as  the  horsemen  passed, 
the  crowd  dropped  behind  them  and  raising  their 
hats  cheered  them.  "  Comrades,"  they  said, 
"  come  over  to  us,  you  know  that  the  government 
is  bad,  you  know  how  the  soldiers  have  been  killed 
through  its  incompetency,  you  know  that  our 
wives  and  children  are  hungry,"  and  more  such 
pleas.  The  Cossacks  and  the  other  soldiers  who 
tried  to  keep  order  were  caught,  they  begged  the 
crowd  to  break  up  and  go  home,  they  pointed  out 
that  they  had  to  do  their  duty  and  that  some- 
body might  get  hurt.  It  was  reported  that  in 
some  places  the  soldiers  did  fire  and  kill  several 
persons. 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  67 

During  Saturday,  men  were  sent,  it  is  not  clear 
by  whom,  to  the  different  factories  to  persuade  the 
workers  to  join  in  a  great  demonstration  on  Sun- 
day.    The  mihtary  commander  of  the  city  tele- 
graphed to  the  Emperor  for  orders  and  the  latter 
sent  word  to  shoot,  if  necessary,  and  to  put  down 
the  uprising  at  any  cost,  and  that  accounts  for  the 
posters   that  were  put   up   on   Sunday  morning 
warning  the  inhabitants  not  to  gather  in  the  streets 
because  the  soldiers  would  shoot  to  kill.    This  had 
happened  before  and  was  no  joke,  and  many  people 
would  not  leave  their  homes  that  day.    Those  who 
did  had  to  walk;  there  was  no  other  way  of  getting 
about.     Few  people,  on  the  whole,  were  on  the 
street  that  morning  aside  from  the  soldiers  and 
Cossacks  who  were  guarding  the  bridges  and  keep- 
ing an  eye  out  for  disturbances.    After  luncheon  I 
started  to  make  a  call  and  as  I  passed  the  barracks 
of  the  Volynski  regiment,  situated  near  where  I 
lived,  I  saw  a  company  of  soldiers  lined  up,  heard 
the  command  to  load,  to  shoulder  arms,  to  march, 
and  off  they  went  to  the  Nevski.    I  followed  them 
for  a  distance  and  then  turned  aside  and  went  my 
way.    In  returning  I  had  to  cross  the  Nevski  and 
found  that  all  avenues  thither  were  guarded  and 
that  no  one  was  allowed  to  go  in  that  direction. 
I  managed,  however,  by  showing  my  American 
passport,  to  get  through  the  line  and  reach  the 
street.    Excited  people  were  moving  up  and  down 
and  from  them  I  learned  that  about  three  o'clock 
a  number  of  people  forced  their  way  to  the  Nevski 
and  were  fired  upon  by  the  soldiers  and  the  ma- 


68  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

chine  guns  that  were  concealed.  Among  the  killed 
of  the  day  was  a  captain  of  police  who  was  knocked 
down  by  a  Cossack. 

Sunday  night  was  full  of  excitement  and  fear  and 
there  were  not  many  who  slept  soundly.  Firing 
was  heard  at  different  times  but  what  it  portended, 
none  of  us  could  tell.  It  became  evident  that  the 
situation  was  becoming  serious,  yet  we  all  felt  that 
the  Government  could  handle  it.  When  I  went  out 
on  the  street  Monday  morning,  the  first  thing  I  saw 
was  the  placard  of  the  military  commander  an- 
nouncing that  unless  the  workmen  went  to  the 
shops,  they  would  be  sent  to  the  front  the  following 
day.  Groups  of  people  were  talking  excitedly  and 
from  them  I  learned  that  the  Volynski  regiment 
had  revolted  and  had  killed  its  oflBcers,  because  the 
day  before  they  had  commanded  the  soldiers  to 
shoot  on  the  people.  It  seems  that  the  soldiers 
returned  home  much  excited  over  their  deed  and 
full  of  remorse.  In  the  course  of  the  night  some 
of  the  revolutionary  soldiers  from  the  city  up- 
braided them  and  they  were  greatly  incensed  with 
their  officers  and  the  Government.  They,  as  well 
as  other  regiments,  were  particularly  worked  up 
over  the  report  that  hirelings  of  the  secret  police 
dressed  in  soldiers'  uniforms  went  about  firing  on 
the  crowd  and  that  the  new  recruits,  under  penalty 
of  death,  were  commanded  to  shoot  on  the  people 
in  the  streets.  When  in  the  morning  the  officers 
congratulated  the  men  on  their  deed  of  yesterday, 
they  jumped  on  them  and  murdered  them.  I 
heard  that  other  regiments  had  also  revolted;  but 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  69 

there  were  so  many  rumors  afloat  that  it  was  not 
easy  to  know  what  to  believe.  iVbout  four  in  the 
afternoon,  I  started  for  home  and  found  the  Nevski 
full  of  frightened  and  nervous  people,  and  hardly 
any  soldiers.  No  one  seemed  to  know  what  to  ex- 
pect. Sounds  of  shooting  were  heard  and  they 
were  explained  as  the  battle  between  the  regiments 
that  had  revolted  and  those  that  had  remained 
loyal.  In  the  distance  columns  of  smoke  were  seen 
and  report  had  it  that  palaces  were  burning.  Again 
it  was  difficult  to  know  the  truth.  As  I  proceeded 
on  my  way,  I  was  joined  by  the  little  minister  of 
the  British  American  Church,  where  I  had  attended 
services  the  day  before,  where  he  had  prayed  fer- 
vently for  the  Tsar  and  his  family  and  asked  God  to 
put  down  the  anarchists,  and  other  lawless  men. 
We  were  discussing  the  situation,  not  knowing  ex- 
actly what  to  make  of  it.  Perhaps  the  word  revo- 
lution passed  our  lips  but  neither  of  us  nor  those 
about  us  took  it  seriously.  Near  the  Liteiny  a  gate 
opened  and  about  two  dozen  armed  soldiers  led  by 
a  petty  officer  stepped  out  and  marched  towards 
the  center  of  the  street.  Immediately  the  crowd, 
excited  and  scared,  scattered  and  ran  for  their  lives 
but  the  soldiers  motioned  for  them  to  stop  and  told 
them  that  they  would  not  shoot.  We  left  them, 
and  proceeded  on  our  way,  trying  as  before  to  in- 
terpret what  we  saw.  While  in  the  midst  of  our 
discussion  we  were  struck  by  a  new  and  unfamiliar 
sound  —  tra-ta-ta,  tra-ta-ta,  and  we  instinctively 
knew  that  a  machine  gun  was  firing.  In  a  flash  the 
streets  were  cleared  and  my  minister  and  I  found 


70  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

ourselves  sticking  like  posters  against  the  waU.  It 
was  my  first  "  baptism  of  fire  "  and  I  had  enough 
presence  of  mind  to  observe  its  effect  upon  myself 
and  others.  Physically  there  was  no  effect  for  no 
one  seemed  hit.  I  tried  to  locate  the  gun  and  the 
man  behind  it,  but  did  not  succeed.  When  the  fir- 
ing ceased,  I  went  on  my  way.  As  I  neared  the 
Nicholas  station,  there  came  rushing  forth  from 
around  the  corner  a  crowd  of  hoodlums  and  sol- 
diers, with  drawn  swords,  which  they  had  taken 
from  the  officers,  and  such  other  weapons  as  they 
could  pick  up,  shouting,  "  Down  with  the  Govern- 
ment !  "  Then  it  dawned  upon  me  that  the  revolu- 
tion was  on  in  earnest,  that  the  anarchists  of 
yesterday's  prayer  had  become  the  heroes  of  a 
great  cause.  What  struck  me  most  of  all  was  the 
kind  of  men  and  women  who  made  this  world  event. 
I  watched  them  during  the  week,  and  they  seemed 
to  be  in  great  part  boys  and  girls,  hoodlums,  stu- 
dents, poorly  dressed  men  and  women,  without 
organization,  plans,  or  leaders.  It  is  difficult  to 
analyze  the  various  motives  that  brought  them  out 
into  the  street.  Not  one  of  the  so-called  revolution- 
ists was  seen,  heard,  shot,  or  wounded.  When  it  was 
all  over  they  appeared  on  the  scene,  rushing  from 
Switzerland,  the  United  States,  France,  and  other 
parts  of  the  world,  to  make  speeches  and  to  divide 
the  spoils.  It  was  a  revolution  without  revolution- 
ists, unless  you  call  the  soldiers  that,  but  they  were 
not  consciously  making  a  revolution,  and  when  it 
was  done,  they  were  thoroughly  surprised  and 
frightened. 


THE  RUSSL\N  REVOLUTION  71 

There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  the  Govern- 
ment collapsed  so  easily.  It  was  not  really  over- 
thrown but  it  toppled  over  like  a  rotten  tree,  and 
until  it  fell,  the  people  did  not  realize  how  decayed 
it  actually  was.  Its  misconduct  of  the  war,  scan- 
dals like  that  of  Rasputin,  ministers  such  as  Proto- 
popov  discredited  and  disgraced  the  dynasty  and 
when  the  end  came,  it  had  few  friends  who  shed 
tears. 

Another  important  factor  in  helping  the  revolu- 
tion was  the  large  number  of  students  and  liberals 
who  served  in  the  army.  To  fill  the  ranks  and  to 
provide  educated  men  for  officers,  it  was  necessary 
to  call  on  university  students,  experts  in  various 
fields  of  engineering,  all  of  whom,  more  or  less,  de- 
sired a  hberal  government.  These  men  worked 
among  the  soldiers  and  officers  with  a  view  to 
creating  a  feeling  of  distrust  in  the  Emperor,  and 
the  Government,  and  its  incompetence  and  corrup- 
tion gave  plenty  of  material  for  the  propagandists. 
Loyalty  to  the  dynasty  was  undermined  and  as 
soon  as  one  prop  was  removed,  as  soon  as  one  com- 
pany of  soldiers  went  over,  the  others  followed  and 
the  whole  edifice  came  tumbling  down. 

Still  another  factor  was  the  large  number  of  new 
recruits  that  were  stationed  in  the  capital;  they 
were  as  yet  not  well  disciplined,  obedience  had 
not  yet  become  a  second  nature  to  them.  Many 
of  them  had  come  from  the  factories,  some  of 
them  were  personally  acquainted  with  the  men 
and  women  who  were  in  the  demonstrations  and 
therefore  would  not  fire  on  them.    Had  there  been 


72  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

at  the  time  in  the  city  three  or  four  old  and  well- 
discipKned  regiments,  or  had  the  Cossacks  who 
were  on  hand  not  interfered  with  the  poKce,  the 
uprising  would  have  been  crushed  quickly  and 
effectively  as  similar  affairs  had  been  before. 

Yet  one  other  factor  contributed  to  the  success 
of  the  revolution  and  that  was  the  over-confidence 
of  the  Government.  The  soldiers  had  been  loyal 
until  now  and  it  never  occurred  to  those  in  power 
that  they  might  not  always  be  so.  They  made  no 
special  preparations  other  than  placing  machine 
guns  on  roofs.  They  did  not  even  make  use  of  the 
armored  cars.  When  they  realized  that  the  army 
in  the  city  could  not  be  trusted,  they  called  for 
troops  from  the  front  but  they  came  too  late. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  monarchy  it  was 
unfortunate  that  Protopopov  sent  the  Emperor  to 
the  front  after  having  secured  from  him  a  signed 
blank  to  dismiss  the  Duma;  for  if  the  Tsar  had  been 
at  Tsarskoe  Selo,  he  might  have  been  prevailed 
upon  to  make  some  concessions  and  saved  the 
dynasty  for  a  time  at  least. 

By  Tuesday  morning,  March  13,  the  revolution 
was  generally  accepted  as  a  fait  accompli;  it  was 
believed  that  the  old  despotism  was  gone  never 
to  return.  This  was  followed  by  an  outburst  of 
idealism  and  patriotism  such  as  comes  but  once  or 
twice  in  the  life  of  a  nation.  Every  Russian  was 
bubbling  over  with  enthusiasm  over  the  glorious 
future  of  his  country.  Liberty  so  greatly  desired, 
so  long  worked  for,  so  much  suffered  for  had  at  last 
come.     The  intelligent  and  persecuted  Russians, 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  73 

they  who  had  spent  years  under  the  shadow  of  the 
poHce,  in  prison,  in  exile,  and  in  Siberia,  had  their 
day  at  last  and  they  were  eager  to  realize  their 
Utopia.  Their  first  demand  was  that  all  prison 
doors  should  be  opened  and  that  the  oppressed  the 
world  over  should  be  freed.  The  Russian  Revolu- 
tion was  not  a  class  revolution,  it  was  brought 
about  neither  by  the  proletariat  nor  by  the  bour- 
geoisie and  the  aristocracy;  all  classes  contributed, 
it  was  a  national  revolution.  So  worthless  had  the 
monarchy  become  that  all  the  people  were  glad  to 
get  rid  of  it  and  see  it  go.  They  who  helped  to 
bring  about  its  ruin  were  the  first  to  deny  it  and 
seek  safety;  and  even  the  Synod,  in  an  almost  un- 
seemly haste,  took  out  the  names  of  the  imperial 
family  from  the  prayer  book. 

The  revolution  was  picturesque  and  full  of  color. 
Nearly  every  morning  one  could  see  regiment  after 
regiment,  soldiers,  Cossacks,  and  sailors,  with  their 
regimental  colors,  and  bands,  and  revolutionary 
flags,  marching  to  the  Duma  to  take  the  new  oath 
of  allegiance.  They  were  cheered,  they  were 
blessed,  handerchiefs  were  waved,  hats  were  raised, 
cigarettes  were  distributed  as  mark  of  appreciation 
and  gratitude  to  these  men,  without  whose  help 
there  would  have  been  no  revolution.  The  enthu- 
siasm became  so  contagious  that  men  and  women, 
young  and  old,  high  and  low,  fell  in  alongside 
or  behind,  joined  in  the  singing  of  the  Marseillaise, 
and  walked  to  the  Duma  to  take  the  oath  of  alle- 
giance and  having  taken  it  they  felt  as  purified  as 
if  they  had  partaken  of  the  communion. 


74  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

Another  picturesque  sight  was  the  army  trucks 
filled  with  armed  soldiers,  red  handkerchiefs  tied 
to  their  bayonets,  dashing  up  and  down  the  streets, 
ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  citizens 
but  really  for  the  mere  joy  of  riding  about  and  be- 
ing cheered.  One  of  these  trucks  stands  out  vividly 
in  my  mind:  it  contained  about  twenty  soldiers, 
having  in  their  midst  a  beautiful  young  woman 
with  a  red  banner,  and  a  young  hoodlum  astride 
the  engine,  a  cigarette  in  one  hand  and  a  sword  in 
the  other.  The  streets  were  full  of  people,  or 
"  tovarishchi "  (comrades),  as  they  called  one 
another,  not  only  the  sidewalks  but  in  the  very 
center,  for  the  tramways  were  not  running.  Great 
events  were  transpiring  and  every  one  who  could 
came  out  to  hear  and  to  see  what  was  going  on. 
There  were  no  newspapers  and  the  street  was  the 
news  center.  Automobiles  came  dashing  through 
scattering  proclamations  and  copies  of  the  Izve- 
stiia  (a  news-sheet  published  by  a  committee  of 
newspaper  men  with  the  authority  of  the  Duma) ; 
and  as  the  crowd  made  a  rush  to  pick  these  up  it 
looked  for  a  moment  as  if  the  whole  world  was 
walking  on  its  head  and  feet  at  the  same  time. 
Those  who  were  fortunate  enough  to  seize  a  paper 
ran  home  with  it  to  read  it  to  the  family,  those^ 
who  were  not  gathered  around  one  of  the  many 
bonfires,  made  from  the  wooden  imperial  eagles, 
crowns,  and  other  insignia  of  royalty,  to  listen  to 
the  reading  of  the  news,  usually  by  a  student.  The 
part  played  by  the  students  during  the  revolution 
has  not  received  the  attention  it  deserves.    When 


THE  RUSSL^^  REVOLUTION  75 

all  others  were  hiding  or  excited  it  was  the  students 
who  took  charge  of  the  leaderless  soldiers,  found 
food  for  them,  collected  money  for  their  welfare, 
and  told  them  what  to  do.  It  was  interesting  to 
watch  with  what  deference  the  soldiers  looked  up 
to  them  and  hung  upon  their  words.  This  impor- 
tance was  not  wholly  lost  upon  the  students,  both 
men  and  women,  and  they  read  the  proclamations 
as  if  they  were  tablets  of  law  handed  down  from 
heaven.  After  the  reading  came  the  discussion. 
One  of  the  favorite  topics  was  the  comparative 
bloodlessness  of  the  revolution  (something  like  169 
killed  and  1264  wounded)  which  proved  that  the 
Russian  Revolution  was  superior  to  the  French  or 
any  other.  Having  started  in  this  vein  the  discus- 
sion turned  on  the  mighty  and  noble  deeds  Russia 
was  going  to  do  now.  Just  as  it  once  freed  Europe 
from  the  yoke  of  Napoleon  so  will  it  now  liberate 
her  from  the  militarism  and  barbarism  of  William 
and  give  freedom  to  all  the  world,  to  all  nationali- 
ties, races,  and  creeds.  The  light  of  the  world  is  to 
come  from  Russia.  The  crowd  meant  it.  The 
soldiers  were  in  earnest  and  patriotic  —  the  praise 
showered  upon  them  and  the  responsibility  placed 
upon  them  seemed  to  uplift  them  —  the  man  with 
the  hoe  became  a  free  citizen  and  behaved  as  such. 
On  Wednesday,  March  14,  the  soldiers  posted  bul- 
letins in  different  parts  of  the  city  calling  on  their 
comrades  to  abstain  from  liquor  and  violence  and 
to  prevent  others  from  committing  lawless  deeds. 
Not  satisfied  with  mere  words  small  companies  of 
militia  visited  the  places  where  drinks  were  sold 


76  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

and  emptied  the  barrels  and  bottles  into  the  gutter. 
For  days  the  Astoria  Hotel  looked  and  smelled  like 
a  wrecked  saloon  after  Carrie  Nation  and  her  as- 
sociates had  stoned  it. 

For  some  time  the  whereabouts  and  intentions  of 
the  Tsar  were  unknown  and  numerous  rumors  were 
afloat.  Some  said  that  he  had  committed  suicide, 
that  he  was  in  the  city,  that  he  was  on  the  way, 
that  he  was  under  arrest,  that  he  had  fled  the  coun- 
try. Another  interesting  question  was  the  form  of 
the  new  government,  should  it  be  a  republic  or  a 
constitutional  monarchy.  Many  of  the  educated 
classes  and  members  of  the  Duma  advocated  a 
constitutional  monarchy  of  the  English  type,  while 
others,  particularly  the  socialistic  groups,  favored  a 
republic,  a  democratic  republic;  whatever  they 
meant  by  that  is  not  clear.  Needless  to  say  the 
great  mass  of  people  did  not  know  the  difference 
between  one  kind  of  government  and  another  but 
they  shouted  as  loudly  as  those  who  knew.  One 
soldier  demanded  a  republic  like  that  of  England, 
another  insisted  on  a  republic  with  a  tsar  at  the 
head,  the  wife  of  the  porter  of  the  house  where  I 
lived  cried  as  if  her  heart  would  break  because 
"  they  wanted  a  republic,"  and  some  of  the  peasant 
women  in  the  country  clamored  for  the  tsar  be- 
cause "  if  they  take  away  the  tsar  they  will  also 
take  away  God  and  what  will  then  become  of  the 
muzhik."  In  one  place  at  the  front  several  regi- 
ments almost  came  to  blows  over  this  question. 
An  orator  ended  his  eloquent  speech  by  saying  that 
"  from  now  on  Russia  will  have  but  one  monarch, 


THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION  77 

the  revolutionary  proletariat."  This  phrase  puz- 
zled the  soldiers,  they  also  misunderstood  the  word 
"  monarch  "  which  they  thought  to  be  "  monakh  " 
(monk).  They  therefore  concluded  that  it  was 
planned  to  put  a  monk  on  the  throne,  and  an  argu- 
ment arose  whether  they  would  have  a  monk  or 
not.  Some  were  in  favor  and  others  opposed.  By 
the  time  it  got  to  the  next  regiment  the  question 
was  whether  they  would  have  the  monk  Iliodor  as 
their  ruler.  It  was  no  longer  a  question  whether 
Russia  was  to  have  a  tsar  but  whether  the  tsar 
should  be  a  monk  or  not,  and  whether  it  should  be 
Iliodor  or  some  other  one. 

Strange  to  say,  as  evening  came  a  kind  of  fear 
seized  the  population,  particularly  the  more  igno- 
rant. It  was  difficult  for  them  to  shake  ofiP  the 
terror  of  the  old  police;  all  the  time  that  they  were 
talking  against  the  tsar  they  had  a  feeling  that  they 
were  doing  wrong,  and  that  some  one  was  denounc- 
ing them.  It  was  hard  for  them  to  believe  that  all 
that  they  saw  and  heard  during  the  day  was  real 
and  that  the  old  regime  was  powerless.  Some  one 
would  start  a  rumor  that  a  monarchist  general 
with  an  army  was  marching  on  the  city  and  that 
he  would  kill  and  burn.  Early  Friday  evening, 
March  16,  as  I  was  walking  down  the  street,  sol- 
diers ran  by  me  shouting  for  every  one  to  get  under 
cover  for  several  hundred  police  from  Tsarskoe 
Selo  were  coming  and  that  there  would  be  street 
jBghting.  Frightened  mothers  grabbed  their  little 
ones  and  hurried  home,  storekeepers  closed  the 
shops,  porters  barricaded  the  gates,  housewives 


78  THE  RUSSIAN  REVOLUTION 

extinguished  the  lights,  and  the  streets  became  as 
dark  and  as  silent  as  a  cemetery.  This  lasted  for 
an  hour  or  more  and  then  came  more  soldiers  an- 
nouncing that  all  was  well,  that  the  supposed 
policemen  were  revolutionary  soldiers  who  had 
come  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance. 

The  exultation  reached  its  highest  point  when 
the  first  temporary  government,  with  Prince 
Lvov  at  the  head,  was  announced.  Every  one  was 
pleased  with  the  men  selected,  they  were  without 
doubt  the  ablest  leaders  of  the  country,  men  who 
had  always  fought  for  the  cause  of  liberty  and  for 
the  interests  of  the  public.  There  was  nothing  but 
praise  for  them  and  assurances  of  support.  The 
fact  that  there  was  a  "  pravitelstvo  "  (government) 
calmed  the  people  and  they  gradually  went  back  to 
their  old  occupations,  but  as  new  men,  with  broader 
outlooks  and  with  higher  aspirations. 

The  taking  of  the  oath  of  office  by  the  new  Min- 
istry was  the  last  act  of  that  wonderful  week  to  be 
unanimously  approved  by  the  people.  When  the 
temporary  government  attempted  to  govern  it 
was  interfered  with  by  the  Council  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Deputies;  the  cry  was  raised  by  the 
Socialist  groups  that  it  was  they  who  had  won  the 
revolution  and  that  they,  therefore,  should  have  all 
the  power.  Since  then  the  country  has  become 
more  and  more  divided  against  itself,  love  has 
turned  into  hate,  joy  into  sorrow. 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT  ^ 

By  ROBERT  J.  KERNER 

IF  there  are  miracles  in  history,  the  Jugo-Slav 
movement  is  a  miracle.  It  is  the  story  of  a  nation 
which  entered  its  new  home  in  the  Balkans  in  the 
seventh  century  and  became  divided  geographi- 
cally and  politically,  in  faith  and  written  language, 
and  in  economic  and  social  life,  until  at  last  its 
spokesmen  could  truthfully  say  that  it  was  divided 
into  thirteen  separate  administrative  units  depend- 
ent upon  fifteen  legislative  bodies. ^  How  did  it 
come  about  that  this  evolution  of  twelve  centuries, 
beginning  with  primeval  unity  and  passing  through 

1  As  used  in  this  paper,  the  term  Jugo-Slav  comprehends  the 
Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes,  but  not  the  Bulgars.  It  is  not  necessary 
here  to  consider  whether  the  latter  are  Slavs  or  Slavicized  Tartars, 
but  merely  to  point  out  that  since  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878,  the 
Bulgars  have  taken  no  part  in  the  movement  which  has  resulted  in 
the  creation  of  Jugo-Slav  nationalism.  The  word  "  jug  "  means 
"  south  "  in  Slavic.    It  is  also  written  "  youg  "  and  "  lug." 

2  In  1915  the  Slovenes  inhabiting  Carniola,  Carinthia,  Styria, 
Istria,  and  Goerz-Gradisca,  and  the  Serbo-Croats  of  Istria  and 
Dalmatia,  were  under  the  direct  rule  of  Austria.  Trieste  and  its  dis- 
trict were  a  part  of  Austria.  The  Serbs  of  Hungary  belonged  to 
Hungary  proper  for  the  most  part;  the  Croats  by  a  fundamental 
agreement  were  entitled  to  autonomy  in  Croatia.  Fiume,  the  sea- 
port of  Croatia  and  Hungary,  had  an  administration  of  its  own. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  possessed  a  diet  and  was  imder  the  dual  rule  of 
Austria  and  Himgary.  All  the  provinces  or  districts  mentioned  above 
were  governed  by  the  two  parliaments  at  Vienna  and  Budapest. 
There  were,  in  addition,  two  independent  Serb  states,  Serbia  and 
Montenegro.  Down  to  1912  Turkey  ruled  over  a  large  number  of 
Serbs. 

81 


82  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

a  political,  economic,  and  social  decomposition  of 
a  most  bewildering  character,  has  once  more  ar- 
rived at  national  unity  and  is  even  now  demand- 
ing the  last  step  —  political  amalgamation  ?  Is  it 
a  doctrine  or  a  dream  or  is  it  a  reality  ? 


When  the  Jugo-Slavs  first  occupied  the  western 
half  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  they  were  one  in 
speech,  in  social  customs  and  ancestry,  and  were 
divided  only  into  tribes.  The  Slovenes,  who 
settled  in  the  northern  end  of  the  west  Balkan 
block,  were  not  separated  from  their  Croat  and 
Serb  kinsmen  by  the  forces  of  geography,  but 
rather  by  the  course  of  political  evolution.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Croats  became  separated  from  the 
Serbs  by  forces  largely  geographical,  though  par- 
tially economic  and  political,  in  nature. 

The  Slovenes  gave  way  before  the  pressure  of  the 
Germans  who  swept  through  the  Alps  and  down 
the  Danube  and  forced  the  Slovene  vojvodes  to 
acknowledge  their  suzerainty  and  accept  their 
religion.  The  Germans  would  doubtless  have  suc- 
ceeded in  obliterating  them  had  not  the  Magyar 
invasion  weakened  their  offensive.  The  Slovenes, 
however,  were  left  a  wrecked  nationality  whose 
fate  became  blended  with  that  of  the  Habsburg 
possessions  and  who  against  the  forces  of  geog- 
raphy—  which  firmly  bound  them  to  the  Croats 
—  were  politically  riveted  to  the  Habsburg  north. 
This  division  was  therefore  the  result  of  forces 
created  by  man  and  changeable  by  him. 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT  83 

The  Croats  settled  in  the  northwestern  half  of 
the  territory  south  of  the  Slovenes;  the  Serbs 
roughly  in  the  southeastern  part  of  it.  Here  geo- 
graphical influences  —  the  direction  of  the  rivers 
and  the  Dinaric  ridges  —  combined  with  divergent 
political  and  economic  possibilities,  produced  a 
dualism.  The  Croats  on  the  Save  and  its  tribu- 
taries naturally  expanded  westward  and  aspired  to 
closer  connection  with  the  sea  where  their  struggle 
with  the  remnants  of  Roman  civilization  and  a 
superior  culture  absorbed  their  energies.  They 
developed  out  of  their  tribal  state  more  quickly, 
while  the  Serbs,  further  inland  and  amid  more  diffi- 
cult surroundings,  developed  more  slowly.  The 
people  who  lived  along  the  Save  aspired  to  control 
the  Dalmatian  coast  which  military  and  geograph- 
ical authorities  claim  can  best  be  held  from  the 
mainland.  The  people  who  lived  in  Montenegro 
or  along  the  Morava,  which  was  the  gateway  to  the 
peninsula,  would  naturally  expand  south  and  east 
toward  the  other  cultural  center,  Constantinople, 
and  thus  seek  to  dominate  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
In  both  cases,  the  attraction  proved  too  much 
for  feudal  kings  and  led  to  the  formation  of  cos- 
mopolitan empires  instead  of  strong  national  mon- 
archies. 

The  kingdoms  of  Croatia  and  Serbia  thus  parted 
company  politicall3\  The  former  became  a  sep- 
arate kingdom  attached  to  Hungary  in  1102  and 
to  the  Habsburg  dynasty  in  1527,  while  the  Serbs 
began  their  expansion  under  the  Nemanja  dynasty 
late  in  the  twelfth  century  and  almost  realized  the 


84  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

dominion  over  the  Balkans  under  Stephen  Dusan 
in  the  fourteenth  century. 

This  political,  geographical,  and  economic  dual- 
ism became  still  greater  when  in  1219  the  Serbs 
cast  their  lot  with  orthodoxy.  The  Croats,  like  the 
Slovenes,  adopted  Roman  Catholicism,  the  Latin 
alphabet,  and  the  culture  of  Rome.  The  Serbs  ac- 
cepted Greek  Orthodoxy,  the  Cyrillic  alphabet,  and 
the  culture  of  Constantinople. 

The  Slovenes  became  a  part  of  the  Austrian  pos- 
sessions of  the  Habsburgs;  the  Croats  fell  under 
the  dominion  of  the  Hungarian  crown  and  the  re- 
public of  Venice;  and  the  Serbs  succumbed  to  the 
Turks  by  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century.  The 
loss  of  political  independence  brought  with  it  ulti- 
mately the  loss  of  the  native  nobility,  the  sole 
guardians  of  the  constitutional  and  historical  rights 
of  the  nations  down  into  the  nineteenth  century  in 
central  Europe.  In  addition,  many  towns  were 
Germanized  and  the  middle  class  disappeared. 
The  Jugo-Slavs,  like  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  appeared 
in  modern  times  as  a  nation  which  had  lost  its 
native  nobility  and  had  been  reduced  to  a  disarmed, 
untutored,  and  enserfed  peasantry.  In  the  absence 
of  these  leaders,  the  nation  turned  to  its  clergy 
who  in  order  to  retain  their  hold  on  the  peasantry 
must  needs  ever  remain  national.  But  here  again 
the  misfortune  which  awaited  the  Jugo-Slavs  was 
that  historically  three  religions  had  taken  deep 
root,  the  Catholic  among  the  Slovenes  and  Croats, 
and  the  Mohammedan  and  Orthodox  among  the 
Serbs. 


THE  JTGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT  85 

We  may  therefore  conclude  the  first  half  of  the 
historical  evolution  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  with  the 
observation  that  political,  economic,  social,  and 
geographical  divisions  led  to  their  downfall  as  a 
nation  and  that  if  they  ever  desired  to  become  one, 
each  one  of  these  chasms  would  have  to  be  bridged. 
A  solution  for  each  of  these  problems  —  the  most 
difficult  which  ever  faced  a  nation — would  have  to 
be  found;  meanwhile  the  policy  of  the  four  masters, 
the  German,  Venetian,  Magyar,  and  Turk,  would 
always  be  "  divide  and  rule,"  in  other  words,  to 
perpetuate  the  divergencies. 

n 

The  history  of  the  evolution  of  the  Jugo-Slavs 
from  the  sixteenth  to  the  twentieth  century  has 
been  an  effort  to  find  the  means  of  melting  down 
these  differences  until  finally  one  —  nationalism 
—  accomplished  the  purpose.  Unity  came  first  in 
the  imagination  and  the  mind,  next  in  literature 
and  speech,  and  finally  in  political  action.  The 
four  hundred  years  beginning  with  the  fifteenth 
and  ending  with  the  eighteenth  century  will  be 
remembered  by  the  Jugo-Slavs  as  the  age  of  humil- 
iation. Only  Slavicized  Ragusa  and  indomitable 
Montenegro  kept  alive  the  imagination  of  the 
nation  which  was  brought  back  to  life  by  the  half- 
religious,  half-national  Slovene  poets  of  the  six- 
teenth century,  by  the  Ragusan  epic  poet  Gundulic, 
by  the  incessant  demands  of  successive  diets  of  the 
ever-weakening  Croatia  in  the  seventeenth  and 


86  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

eighteenth  centuries,  and  by  the  progressive  and 
zealous  Serbs  of  Hungary,  who  ever  since  the  fif- 
teenth century  in  increasing  numbers  made  their 
home  there,  refugees  from  the  oppression  of  the 
Turk,  but  who  ever  longed  to  push  out  from  the 
frontier  and  rebuild  Serbia  anew.  Krizanic,  a 
Croat  Catholic  Dalmatian  priest,  a  firm  believer 
in  Jugo-Slav  and  Slavic  unity  in  general,  appealed 
to  the  rising  Russian  empire  to  help  save  dying 
Slavdom. 

While  the  Turkish  and  the  Venetian  empires 
decayed,  the  Austrian  and  the  Russian  gained  cour- 
age. By  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
house  of  Habsburg  had  won  back  all  except  the 
Banat  and  in  the  eighteenth  century  aspired  to 
divide  the  Balkan  peninsula  in  halves  with  the 
Russians.  Along  with  this  future  foreign  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  the  Balkans  came  the  Ger- 
manizing and  centralizing  "  reforms  "  of  Maria 
Theresa  and  Joseph  II,  whose  result  was  to  cripple 
still  further  the  few  constitutional  and  historical 
rights  which  remained  to  the  Jugo-Slavs.  But 
these  "  reforms  "  had  nevertheless  salutary  effects 
upon  the  nation  of  peasants.  The  enlightened 
despots,  spurred  on  by  the  loss  of  Silesia  —  which 
was  at  the  same  time  a  great  loss  in  revenue  as 
well  as  prestige  —  sought  to  make  good  the  loss 
by  the  economic  betterment  and  education  of 
the  peasantry.  How  else  could  an  agrarian  state 
increase  its  revenue  and  supply  able-bodied  men 
for  the  numerous  armies  which  the  overarma- 
ments   of  Frederick  II  had  brought  upon  central 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MO^'EMENT  87 

Europe  ?  ^  Centralization  and  Germanization  really 
helped  to  awaken  the  Slavs.  Enlightened  despot- 
ism gave  them  the  weapons  of  political  struggle — 
education  and  economic  resources. 

Of  the  Jugo-Slavs,  the  Serbs  of  Hungary  were 
the  first  to  achieve  national  and  cultural  conscious- 
ness. In  the  absence  of  a  native  nobility,  but  with 
unusual  economic  opportunities  at  their  command, 
they  developed  a  wealthy  middle  class  —  a  rare 
thing  among  Slavs  before  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  This  class  came  into  contact  with 
nationalized  western  Europe  and  found  that  the 
bulwark  against  national  oppression  was  educa- 
tion for  the  masses.  The  nation  must  be  educated 
and  must  be  economically  sound  in  order  to  under- 
take the  political  struggle  against  the  Germans, 
the  Magyars,  and  the  Turks.  That  was  the  back- 
ground of  Dositej  Obradovic's  literary  labors  as  he 
raised  spoken  Serbian  ultimately  to  the  literary 
language  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  and  of  Karadzic's 
efforts  which  resulted  in  that  wonderful  collection 
of  Serbian  national  poems,  and  which  clinched  for 
all  time  the  literary  supremacy  of  the  Sto  dialect. 
Serbian  Hungary  was  the  starting  place  for  Kara 
George's  revolution  which  brought  partial  freedom 
in  1804  and  autonomy  in  1830  and  thus  planted 
the  germ  of  the  modern  Greater  Serbia. 

^  Emphasis  on  this  fundamental  fact  of  Habsbm"g  history  in  the 
eighteenth  centm-y  cannot  be  too  strong.  The  WTiter  of  this  paper 
hopes  soon  to  present  archival  proof  of  the  far-reaching  results  of  the 
seizure  of  Silesia.  The  documents  are  to  be  found  in  the  archives  of 
the  Hofkammer  and  Ministerium  des  Innern  in  Vienna. 


88  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

Napoleon's  Illyria,  created  in  1809,  joined  for  the 
first  time  Slovenes  and  Croats  in  one  political  unit, 
and  the  excellent  administration  and  the  schools 
left  an  undying  memory  of  what  might  be  if  the 
Habsburgs  cared.  Vodnik,  the  Slovene  poet,  sang 
of  Illyria  and  her  creator,  but  it  was  the  meteoric 
Croat,  Ljudevit  Gaj,  in  the  thirties,  who  so  elo- 
quently idealized  it  as  he  poured  heated  rhetoric 
into  the  camp  of  the  Magyars,  who  after  the  Diet 
of  1825  began  their  unfortunate  policy  of  Magj^ar- 
ization.  Illyria,  though  short-lived,  became  the 
germ  of  the  Greater  Croatia  idea,  which,  with 
Greater  Serbia,  existed  as  the  two,  not  necessarily 
hostile,  solutions  of  the  Jugo-Slav  problem  down 
to  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  It  was  as  yet  a  friendly 
rivalry  with  the  possible  formation  of  two  separate 
units.  The  occupation  of  Bosnia  in  1878  led  to 
actual  friction  between  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  annexation  of  the  same  province  in  1908  had 
just  the  opposite  effect,  for  from  that  time  the 
ultimate  ideal  was  no  longer  Greater  Croatia  or 
Greater  Serbia  in  any  selfish  sense,  but  Jugo- 
slavia, because,  to  use  a  platitude,  Bosnia  had 
scrambled  the  eggs.  Evidence  of  the  fairly  am- 
icable relations  between  Slovenes,  Croats,  and 
Serbs  at  the  time  of  Gaj  is  not  lacking.  It  was  Gaj 
who  reformed  Croatian  orthography  on  the  basis 
of  the  Serbian.  Bleiweis  and  Vraz  endeavored  to 
do  the  same  in  Slovene. 

The  revolution  of  1848  demonstrated  still  further 
the  friendly  relations  of  these  potential  rivals  as 
national  unifiers.    For  the  first  time,  the  Croats 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEINIENT  89 

and  Serbs  publicly  fraternized  and  showed  that  the 
seemingly  insurmountable  barrier  of  religious  dif- 
ference tended  to  disappear  in  the  struggle  for 
national  independence.  In  this  sense  the  events 
of  1848  —  when  the  hand  of  the  foreign  master 
was  for  the  while  taken  away  —  have  given  confi- 
dent hope  to  those  who  believe  that  Jugo-Slav 
differences  are  soluble.  Jelacic,  Ban  of  Croatia,  the 
idol  of  the  Serbo-Croats,  was  proclaimed  dictator 
and  supported  by  the  Croatian  Diet  at  Zagreb 
(Agram)  and  the  Serbian  assembly  at  Karlovac 
(Karlowitz).  The  Serb  Patriarch  Rajacic  and  the 
young  and  gifted  Stratimirovic,  provisional  ad- 
ministrator of  the  Serb  Vojvodina,  attended  the 
Croatian  Diet  and  the  High  Mass  where  Bishop 
Ozegovic  sang  the  Te  Deum  in  Old  Slavic.  After 
Gaj,  Rajacic,  and  Stratimirovic  had  failed  at  Vienna 
and  Pressburg  to  bend  the  dynasty  or  the  defiant 
Kossuth,  Jelacic  was  empowered  to  defend  the 
monarchy  and  bring  back  the  historical  rights  of 
the  Triune  Kingdom  and  the  Serb  Vojvodina.  The 
dynasty  and  the  monarchy  survived,  but  Jugo- 
Slav  hopes  and  the  promises  they  had  received  were 
unfulfilled  or  soon  withdrawn,  as  for  instance  the 
Vojvodina  in  1861.  Absolutism  reigned  supreme 
from  1849  to  1860. 

This  disappointment  led  the  Croats  and  Serbs  to 
try  cooperation  with  the  Magyars,  who  under 
Deak  and  Eotvos  appeared  to  be  anxious  to  con- 
ciliate the  non-Magyars  in  those  uncertain  years 
which  began  in  1859  and  ended  in  dualism. 
Austria  lacked  a  great  statesman,  and  the  Prusso- 


90  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

Austrian  rivalry  led  the  fearful  and  impatient 
Francis  Joseph  into  the  Compromise  (Ausgleich) 
of  1867.  It  was  a  work  of  haste  and  expediency  and 
bound  with  it  the  fate  of  the  dynasty.  Thereafter, 
the  German  minority  in  Austria  and  the  Magyar 
minority  in  Hungary  were  the  decisive  factors  in 
the  problems  confronting  the  Jugo-Slavs.  Dal- 
matia  was  handed  over  to  Austria;  Croatia,  by  a 
compromise,  which  it  has  never  really  accepted,  to 
Hungary. 

The  Ausgleich  between  Austria  and  Hungary 
and  Hungary  and  Croatia  opened  in  1868  a  period 
which  ended  in  1905  —  it  was  a  period,  on  the  one 
hand  of  the  greatest  decay  and  decomposition  in 
the  political  life  of  the  Jugo-Slavs,  and,  on  the 
other,  of  the  greatest  literary  and  intellectual  unity 
as  shaped  by  Bishop  Strossmayer  and  Peter  II  and 
Nicholas  of  Montenegro. 

Bishop  Strossmayer  and  the  Slovene,  Croat,  and 
Serb  academies,  matica,  and  learned  societies,  as 
well  as  men  of  literature,  spoke,  wrote,  and  pleaded 
for  unity  in  this  period,  in  vain.  But  they  and  the 
universities  of  Prague  and  Zagreb  produced  a 
younger  generation  which  later  took  up  the  fight 
for  national  unity  and  which  abandoned  individual 
political  foibles  and  looked  over  the  boundaries  of 
their  provinces  for  inspiration. 

Among  the  Slovenes,  politics  degenerated  into 
the  struggle  for  minor  concessions  from  the  court 
at  Vienna  in  regard  to  the  Slovene  language  and 
schools,  while  political  parties  multiplied  freely 
through  personal  and  social  differences.    The  lines 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  ISIO^'EMENT  91 

which  bound  them  to  their  kinsmen  in  the  south 
were  weakest  during  this  period. 

The  Croats  found  themselves  no  match  for  the 
astute  Magyars  who  resorted  to  packed  diets,  gerry- 
mandering, bribery,  and  forgery.  The  Compromise 
(Nagoda)  of  1868  was  as  decisive  as  the  murder  of 
the  farsighted  Prince  Michael  of  Serbia  in  that  year. 
It  will  be  remembered  that,  in  spite  of  his  many 
faults,  he  had  made  an  agreement  with  Monte- 
negro for  the  ultimate  merging  of  their  states  and, 
after  allying  himself  with  Rumania,  had  carried 
out  an  agreement  with  the  Bulgarian  committee 
for  the  amalgamation  of  Bulgaria  with  Serbia,  thus 
obtaining  a  commanding  influence  in  the  Balkans. 
With  his  death,  Serbia  fell  into  the  hands  of  Milan 
and  Alexander,  whose  weak  and  erratically  despotic 
reigns  ushered  in  an  era  in  Serbian  history  from 
which  she  emerged  in  1903,  through  the  assas- 
sination and  the  extinction  of  the  last  of  the  Obre- 
novics,  a  country  without  a  good  name,  a  nation 
which,  through  no  special  fault  of  its  own,  had 
become  degraded. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  this  political  decay  that  the 
Bosnians  revolted  in  1875  and  that  Serbia,  Monte- 
negro, Russia,  and  Rumania  became  involved  in 
the  Russo-Turkish  war.  Space  forbids  but  the 
most  hasty  survey  of  the  occupation  and  adminis- 
tration by  Austria  of  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina 
by  virtue  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878. 

Bismarck,  Francis  Joseph,  and  Andrassy  were 
swayed  by  differing  motives  whose  total  result  was 
that  Austria  was  to  become  a  Balkan  power  —  the 


92  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

outpost  of  the  German  Drang  nach  Osien  —  and 
that  it  was  worth  while  making  a  greater  Serbia 
impossible,  even  at  the  cost  of  increasing  the  num- 
ber of  Slavs  in  the  Habsburg  monarchy,  which, 
now  reenforced  by  the  Ausgleich,  could  stand  the 
strain  of  advancing  democracy  and  the  necessity, 
therefore,  of  granting  further  rights  to  the  Slavs. 

The  occupation  of  Bosnia  led  to  the  first  real 
quarrels  in  modern  times  between  Croat  and  Serb, 
for  the  former  wanted  Bosnia  in  Greater  Croatia 
in  order  to  have  connection  with  Dalmatia;  the 
latter  wished  it  annexed  to  Greater  Serbia,  because 
it  was  Serbian.  Magyar  and  German,  further, 
quarreled  as  to  the  status  of  Bosnia  and  left  it 
unsettled.  But  one  thing  was  settled  by  the 
occupation  in  1879  and  the  annexation  in  1908. 
Neither  Greater  Croatia  nor  Greater  Serbia  were 
any  longer  truly  possible  as  a  final  solution,  only  a 
Jugo-Slavia.  The  Greater  Croatia  received  a  mortal 
blow  by  the  addition  of  Serbs  up  to  more  than  one 
third  of  the  number  of  Croats  in  Austria-Hungary, 
and  Serbia  faced  the  future  either  as  a  vassal  or  as 
a  territory  which  must  be  annexed.  From  that 
time  until  the  present  the  Habsburg  monarchy, 
largely  owing  to  the  predominance  of  the  Magyars 
in  Croatia,  adopted  a  policy  of  prevention  —  Jugo- 
slav nationality  was  to  be  prevented.  Viewed  in 
that  light  the  rule  of  Count  Khuen-Hedervary, 
Ban  of  Croatia  from  1883  to  1903,  in  which  time, 
according  to  Croats,  he  corrupted  a  whole  genera- 
tion, turned  Serb  against  Croat,  and  played  out 
the  radical  demands  of  the  party  of  Starcevic  and 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MO\^MENT  93 

Frank,  is  intelligible.  The  policy  of  Count  Khuen, 
which  was  based  on  corruption  and  forgery,  on 
press-muzzling  and  career-exploding,  has  since  been 
imitated,  and  its  imitation  has  been  largely  re- 
sponsible for  this  war. 

It  was  not  until  the  Serbs  and  Croats  formed 
their  coalition  in  1905  that  the  trial  of  strength 
had  come.  In  Serbia,  Peter  Karageorgevitch  as- 
cended the  throne  and  reversed  the  pro-Austrian 
policy  of  his  predecessor.  This  it  will  be  remem- 
bered was  influenced  until  then  by  the  Bulgarian 
policy  of  Russia  and  by  Serbia's  defeat  at  the 
hands  of  Bulgaria  in  1885.  The  commercial  treaty 
with  Bulgaria  in  1905,  and  the  tariff  war  which 
Austria  began  immediately  afterward,  pointed  out 
which  way  the  wind  was  blowing. 

An  era  big  with  decisive  events  arrived.  The 
Jugo-Slavs  had  learned  that  union  meant  victory, 
division  foreign  mastery.  Petty  politics  and  reli- 
gious fanaticism  were  forgotten,  and  Jugo-Slav 
nationality  was  formed  in  the  fierce  fires  of 
Austro-Magyar  terrorism  and  forgery  and  in  the 
whirlwind  reaped  from  the  Balkan  wars. 

It  was  too  late  to  talk  of  trialism  unless  it  meant 
independence,  and,  when  it  meant  that,  it  did  not 
mean  Austrian  trialism.  The  treason  trial  by  which 
Baron  Ranch  hoped  to  split  the  Serbo-Croat  coali- 
tion, and  which  was  to  furnish  the  cause  of  a  war 
with  Serbia  on  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  in  1908, 
collapsed.  It  rested  on  forgeries  concocted  within 
the  walls  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  legation  in 
Belgrade  where  Count  Forgach  held  forth. 


94  THE  JUGO-SLAV  MOVEMENT 

The  annexation  of  Bosnia  in  1908  completed  the 
operation  begun  in  1878  and  called  for  the  comple- 
tion of  the  policy  of  prevention.  It  was  the  fore- 
runner of  the  press  campaign  in  the  first  Balkan 
war,  the  Prohaska  affair,  the  attack  by  Bulgaria 
upon  Serbia  and  Greece,  the  rebuff  to  Masaryk 
and  Pasic,  the  murder  of  Francis  Ferdinand,  and 
the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia.  The  mys- 
teries connected  with  the  forgeries  and  this  chain 
of  events  will  remain  a  fertile  field  for  detectives 
and  psychologists  and,  after  that,  for  historians. 
For  us,  it  is  necessary  to  note  that,  as  the  hand  of 
Pan-Germanism  became  more  evident,  the  Slovenes 
began  to  draw  nearer  to  the  Croats  and  the  Serbs. 
It  remained  only  for  the  Serbs  to  electrify  the  Jugo- 
slavs —  "to  avenge  Kossovo  with  Kumanovo  " 
—  in  order  to  cement  their  loyalty  to  the  regener- 
ated Serbs.  Religious  differences,  political  rivalries, 
linguistic  quibbles,  and  the  petty  foibles  of  cen- 
turies appeared  to  be  forgotten  in  the  three  short 
years  which  elapsed  from  Kumanovo  to  the  de- 
struction of  Serbia  in  1915.  The  Greater  Serbia 
idea  had  really  perished  in  1915,  as  had  the  Greater 
Croatia  idea  in  1878.  In  their  place  emerged  Jugo- 
slavia—  the  kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes  —  implied  by  the  South  Slav  Parliamen- 
tary Club  in  Austria  in  their  Declaration  of  May 
30,  1917,  and  formulated  by  the  Pact  of  Corfu  of 
July  7,  1917,  which  Pasic,  premier  of  Serbia,  and 
Trumbic,  the  head  of  the  London  Jugo-Slav 
Committee,  drew  up. 


THE  JUGO-SLAV  MO^^EMENT  95 

The  evolution  had  been  completed.  Nationalism 
had  proved  stronger  than  geography,  stronger  than 
opposing  religions,  more  cohesive  than  political 
and  economic  interests.  For  this,  the  Jugo-Slavs 
have  not  only  themselves  and  modern  progress, 
like  railroad-building,  to  thank,  but  also  the  policy 
of  the  Habsburg  monarchy,  the  hopeful,  though 
feeble,  Note  of  the  Allies  to  President  Wilson,  the 
Russian  Revolution,  and  the  entry  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war. 

For  the  historian,  it  remains  to  examine  the 
depth  and  the  character  of  the  movement.  He 
should  neither  lament  that  it  succeeded,  nor  frown 
upon  it  that  it  did  not  come  long  ago  when  his  own 
nation  achieved  its  unity.  That  it  is  a  reality  is 
proved  by  the  fact  that  the  Central  Powers  be- 
lieved its  destruction  worth  this  catastrophic  war. 
A  nation  of  eleven  or  twelve  millions  holds  the  path 
to  the  Adriatic  and  the  Aegean  and  the  gateway  to 
the  Orient  and  world  dominion.  It  can  help  to 
make  impossible  the  dream  of  mid-Europe  or  of 
Pan-Germany. 

The  Jugo-Slav  movement  has  ended  in  the  for- 
mation of  a  nation  which  is  neither  a  doctrine,  nor 
a  dream,  but  a  reality. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  I 

DECLARATION  OF  THE  JUGO-SLAV  CLUB 
OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  P.\RLIAMENT 

On  Mat  30,  1917  ' 

"  The  undersigned  deputies,  assembled  as  the  *  Jugo- 
slav Club,'  taking  their  stand  on  the  principle  of  na- 
tionalities and  on  the  rights  of  the  Croatian  state, 
declare  that  they  demand  that  all  the  countries  in  which 
Slovenes,  Croats,  and  Serbs  live  shall  be  united  in  an 
independent  and  democratic  state  organism,  free  from 
the  domination  of  any  foreign  nation  and  placed  under 
the  sceptre  of  the  dynasty  Habsburg-Lorraine.  They 
declare  that  they  will  employ  all  their  forces  to  realize 
this  demand  of  their  single  nation.  The  undersigned 
will  take  part  in  the  parliamentary  labor  after  having 
made  this  reserve.  .  .  ." 

^  Referring  to  the  Declaration  of  the  Jugo-SIav  Club,  May  30, 
1917,  in  the  Vienna  Parliament,  J.  J.  Grgurevich,  Secretary  of  the 
South  Slavic  National  Council,  Washington,  D.  C,  ^vTites: 

"  In  order  to  understand  correctly  this  Declaration,  it  is  necessary 
to  state  that  the  same  was  presented  in  the  Vienna  Parliament  during 
war  time,  when  each,  even  the  most  innocent,  word  in  regard  to  rights, 
principles  of  nationality,  and  liberty  of  peoples,  was  considered  and 
punished  as  a  crime  and  treason,  by  imprisonment,  even  death. 

"  Were  it  not  for  these  facts,  this  Declaration  would  never  contain 
the  words:  '  and  placed  under  the  sceptre  of  the  dynasty  Habsburg- 
Lorraine.'  It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  insert  these  words  in  order 
to  make  possible  the  public  announcement  of  this  Declaration;  it  was 
necessary  to  make  a  moral  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  a  great  moral  and 
material  gain,  which  was  secured  through  this  Declaration  among  the 
people  to  which  it  was  addressed  and  which  understood  it  in  the  sense 
and  in  the  spirit  of  the  Declaration  of  Corfu." 


99 


APPENDIX  II 

THE  PACT  OF  CORFU 

At  the  conference  of  the  members  of  the  late  (Serbian) 
Coalition  Cabinet  and  those  of  the  present  Cabinet,  and 
also  the  representatives  of  the  Jugo-Slav  Committee  in 
London,  all  of  whom  have  hitherto  been  working  on 
parallel  lines,  views  have  been  exchanged  in  collabora- 
tion with  the  president  of  the  Skupstina,  on  all  questions 
concerning  the  life  of  the  Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes  in 
their  joint  future  State. 

We  are  happy  in  being  able  once  more  on  this  occa- 
sion to  point  to  the  complete  unanimity  of  all  parties 
concerned. 

In  the  first  place,  the  representatives  of  the  Serbs, 
Croats  and  Slovenes  declare  anew  and  most  categori- 
cally that  our  people  constitutes  but  one  nation,  and 
that  it  is  one  in  blood,  one  by  the  spoken  and  written 
language,  by  the  continuity  and  unity  of  the  territory 
in  which  it  lives,  and  finally  in  virtue  of  the  common  and 
vital  interests  of  its  national  existence  and  the  general 
development  of  its  moral  and  material  life. 

The  idea  of  its  national  unity  has  never  suffered  ex- 
tinction, although  all  the  intellectual  forces  of  its  enemy 
were  directed  against  its  unification,  its  liberty  and  its 
national  existence.  Divided  between  several  States, 
our  nation  is  in  Austria-Hungary  alone  split  up  into 
eleven  provincial  administrations,  coming  under  thir- 
teen legislative  bodies.  The  feeling  of  national  unity, 
together  with  the  spirit  of  liberty  and  independence, 

100 


APPENDIX  II  101 

have  supported  it  in  the  never-ending  struggles  of  cen- 
turies against  the  Turks  in  the  East  and  against  the 
Germans  and  the  Magyars  in  the  West. 

Being  numerically  inferior  to  its  enemies  in  the  East 
and  West,  it  was  impossible  for  it  to  safeguard  its  unity 
as  a  nation  and  a  State,  its  liberty  and  its  independence 
against  the  brutal  maxim  of  "  might  goes  before  right  " 
militating  against  it  both  East  and  West. 

But  the  moment  has  come  when  our  people  is  no 
longer  isolated.  The  war  imposed  by  German  mili- 
tarism upon  Russia,  upon  France  and  upon  England  for 
the  defense  of  their  honor  as  well  as  for  the  liberty  and 
independence  of  small  nations,  has  developed  into  a 
struggle  for  the  Liberty  of  the  World  and  the  Triumph 
of  Right  over  Might.  All  nations  which  love  liberty  and 
independence  have  allied  themselves  together  for  their 
common  defense,  to  save  civilization  and  liberty  at  the 
cost  of  every  sacrifice,  to  establish  a  new  international 
order  based  upon  justice  and  upon  the  right  of  every 
nation  to  dispose  of  itseK  and  so  organize  its  independ- 
ent life;  finally  to  establish  a  durable  peace  conse- 
crated to  the  progress  and  development  of  humanity 
and  to  secure  the  world  against  a  catastrophe  similar  to 
that  which  the  conquering  lust  of  German  Imperialism 
has  provoked. 

To  noble  France,  who  has  proclaimed  the  liberty  of 
nations,  and  to  England,  the  hearth  of  liberty,  the  Great 
American  Republic  and  the  new,  free  and  democratic 
Russia  have  joined  themselves  in  proclaiming  as  their 
principal  war  aim  the  triumph  of  liberty  and  democracy 
and  as  basis  of  the  new  international  order  the  right  of 
free  self-determination  for  every  nation. 

Our  nation  of  the  three  names,  which  has  been  the 
greatest  sufferer  under  brute  force  and  injustice  and 


102  APPENDIX  II 

which  has  made  the  greatest  sacrifices  to  preserve  its 
right  of  self-determination,  has  with  enthusiasm  ac- 
cepted this  subhme  principle  put  forward  as  the  chief 
aim  of  this  atrocious  war,  provoked  by  the  violation 
of  this  very  principle. 

The  authorized  representatives  of  the  Serbs,  Croats 
and  Slovenes,  in  declaring  that  it  is  the  desire  of  our 
people  to  free  itself  from  every  foreign  yoke  and  to  con- 
stitute itself  a  free,  national  and  independent  State,  a 
desire  based  on  the  principle  that  every  nation  has  the 
right  to  decide  its  own  destiny,  are  agreed  in  judging 
that  this  State  should  be  founded  on  the  following 
modern  and  democratic  principles : 

(1)  The  State  of  the  Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes,  who 
are  also  known  as  the  Southern  Slavs  or  Jugo-Slavs, 
will  be  a  free  and  independent  kingdom,  with  indivi- 
sible territory  and  imity  of  allegiance.  It  will  be  a 
constitutional,  democratic  and  parliamentary  mon- 
archy under  the  Karageorgevitch  Dynasty,  which  has 
always  shared  the  ideas  and  the  feelings  of  the  nation, 
placing  liberty  and  the  national  will  above  all  else. 

(2)  This  State  will  be  named  "  The  Kingdom  of  the 
Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes."  And  the  style  of  the 
Sovereign  will  be  "  King  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes." 

(3)  The  State  will  have  a  single  coat-of-arms,  a  single 
flag,  and  a  single  crown.  These  emblems  will  be  com- 
posed of  the  present  existing  emblems.  The  unity  of 
the  State  will  be  symbolized  by  the  coat-of-arms  and 
the  flag  of  the  Kingdom. 

(4)  The  special  Serb,  Croat,  and  Slovene  flags  rank 
equally  and  may  be  freely  hoisted  on  all  occasions. 
The  special  coat-of-arms  may  be  used  with  equal 
freedom. 


APPENDIX  II  103 

(5)  The  three  national  designations  —  Serbs,  Croats, 
and  Slovenes  —  are  equal  before  the  law  throughout 
the  territory  of  the  Kingdom,  and  everyone  may  use 
them  freely  upon  all  occasions  of  public  life  and  in 
dealing  with  the  authorities. 

(6)  The  two  alphabets,  the  Cyrillic  and  the  Latin, 
also  rank  equally,  and  everyone  may  use  them  freely 
throughout  the  territory  of  the  Kingdom.  The  royal 
authorities  and  the  local  self-governing  authorities 
have  both  the  right  and  the  duty  to  employ  both 
alphabets  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  citizens. 

(7)  All  recognized  religions  may  be  freely  and  publicly 
exercised.  The  Orthodox,  Roman  Catholic  and  Mus- 
sulman faiths,  which  are  those  chiefly  professed  by 
our  nation,  shall  rank  equally  and  enjoy  equal  rights 
with  regard  to  the  State. 

In  consideration  of  these  principles  the  legislative  will 
take  special  care  to  safeguard  religious  concord  in  con- 
formity with  the  spirit  and  tradition  of  our  whole 
nation. 

(8)  The  calendar  will  be  unified  as  soon  as  possible. 

(9)  The  territory  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Serbs, 
Croats  and  Slovenes  will  include  all  the  territory  in- 
habited compactly  and  in  territorial  continuity  by  our 
nation  of  the  three  names.  It  cannot  be  mutilated 
without  detriment  to  the  vital  interests  of  the  com- 
munity. 

Our  nation  demands  nothing  that  belongs  to  others. 
It  demands  only  what  is  its  own.  It  desires  to  free  itself 
and  to  achieve  its  unity.  Therefore  it  consciously  and 
firmly  refuses  every  partial  solution  of  the  problem  of 
its  national  liberation  and  unification.  It  puts  forward 
the  proposition  of  its  deliverance  from  Austro-Hun- 


104  APPENDIX  II 

garian  domination  and  its  imion  with  Serbia  and  Mon- 
tenegro in  a  single  State  forming  an  indivisible  whole. 

In  accordance  with  the  right  of  self-determination  of 
peoples,  no  part  of  this  territorial  totality  may  without 
infringement  of  justice  be  detached  and  incorporated 
with  some  other  State  without  the  consent  of  the  nation 
itself. 

(10)  In  the  interests  of  freedom  and  of  the  equal  right 
of  all  nations,  the  Adriatic  shall  be  free  and  open  to 
each  and  all. 

(11)  All  citizens  throughout  the  territory  of  the  King- 
dom shall  be  equal  and  enjoy  the  same  rights  with 
regard  to  the  State  and  before  the  Law. 

(12)  The  election  of  the  Deputies  to  the  National 
Representative  body  shall  be  by  universal  suffrage, 
with  equal,  direct  and  secret  ballot.  The  same  shall 
apply  to  the  elections  in  the  Communes  and  other  ad- 
ministrative units.  Elections  will  take  place  in  each 
Commune. 

(13)  The  Constitution,  to  be  established  after  the 
conclusion  of  peace  by  a  Constituent  Assembly  elected 
by  universal  suffrage,  with  direct  and  secret  ballot, 
will  be  the  basis  of  the  entire  life  of  the  State;  it  will 
be  the  source  and  the  consummation  of  all  authority 
and  of  all  rights  by  which  the  entire  life  of  the  nation 
will  be  regulated. 

The  Constitution  will  provide  the  nation  with  the 
possibility  of  exercising  its  special  energies  in  local 
autonomies  delimited  by  natural,  social  and  economic 
conditions. 

The  Constitution  must  be  passed  in  its  entirety  by 
a  numerically  defined  majority  in  the  Constituent 
Assembly. 


APPENDIX  II  105 

The  Constitution,  like  all  other  laws  passed  by  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  will  only  come  into  force  after 
having  received  the  Royal  sanction. 

The  nation  of  the  Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes,  thus 
unified,  will  form  a  State  of  about  twelve  million  in- 
habitants. This  State  will  be  the  guarantee  for  their 
independence  and  national  development,  and  their 
national  and  intellectual  progress  in  general,  a  mighty 
bulwark  against  the  German  thrust,  an  inseparable  ally 
of  all  the  civilized  nations  and  states  which  have  pro- 
claimed the  principle  of  right  and  liberty  and  that  of 
international  justice.  It  will  be  a  worthy  member  of  the 
new  Community  of  Nations. 

Drawn  up  in  Corfu,  July  7/20,  1917. 

The  Prime  Minister  of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia  and  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs 

(Sgd.)      Nikola  P.  Pashitch, 

The  President  of  the  Jugo-Slav  Committee 

(Sgd.)       Dr.  Ante  Trumbic, 

Advocate,  Deputy  and  Leader  of  the  Croatian  National 
Party  in  the  Dalmatian  Diet,  late  Mayor  of  Split 
(Spalato),  late  Deputy  for  the  District  ofZadar  {Zara) 
in  the  Austrian  Parliament. 


APPENDIX  III 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  HINTS 

The  following  bibliography  is  nothing  but  a  selected 
list  and  it  has  not  seemed  advisable  to  include  material 
which  is  to  be  found  in  periodicals.^ 

Perhaps  the  most  recent  and  best  general  statement  of 
the  Jugo-Slav  problem  as  a  whole  is  to  be  found  in 
A.  H.  E.  Taylor's  The  Future  of  the  Soutliern  Slavs  (New 
York,  1917).  Another  useful  general  work  is  by  the 
Serb,  V.  R.  Savic.  The  title  is,  South-Eastern  Europe: 
The  Main  Problem  of  the  Present  World  Struggle  (New 
York,  1918).  This  is  an  American  edition,  revised  and 
enlarged,  of  the  author's  English  work:  The  Reconstruc- 
tion of  South-Eastern  Europe  (London,  1917).  The 
noted  French  historian,  to  whom  the  western  world 
owes  much  of  its  knowledge  about  Slavic  history,  Ernest 
Denis,  presents  an  able  survey  of  the  general  problem  in 
his  La  grande  Serbie  (Paris,  1915).  It  is  written  largely 
around  Serbia,  like  Savic's  book.  B.  Vosnjak  in  A  Bul- 
wark against  Germany  (London,  1917),  and  A  Dying 
Empire  (London,  1918),  presents  to  western  readers,  for 
the  first  time,  the  development  of  the  Slovene  districts 
of  Austria  and  their  relation  to  that  empire  and  to  the 
Jugo-Slavs. 

With  regard  to  Austria-Hungary  and  the  Jugo-Slavs 
in  particular,  the  west  owes  most  to  the  penetrating 
studies  of  R.  W.  Seton- Watson,  who  formerly  wrote 
under  the  name  of  Scotus  Viator.     Before  the  war, 

^  For  further  information  the  investigator  may  consult  Slainc 
Europe:  A  Selected  Bibliography  in  the  Western  European  Languages 
comprising  History,  Languages,  and  Literature.  By  R.  J.  Kerner. 
In  press. 

106 


APPENDIX  III  107 

Seton-Watson  wrote  The  Southern  Slav  Problem  and 
tlie  Habsburg  Monarchy  (London,  1911),  wherein  he  dis- 
cusses the  whole  problem  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Croats,  in  contrast  to  the  Serbs.  The  author  subse- 
quently rectified  this  point  of  view  in  The  Balkans,  Italy, 
and  the  Adriatic  (London,  1915);  German,  Slav,  and 
Magyar  (London,  1916) ;  and  The  Rise  of  Nationality  in 
the  Balkans  (London,  1917). 

Numerous  writers  on  Austrian  and  Balkan  affairs 
have  devoted  parts  of  their  general  works  to  the  Jugo- 
slav movement.  Only  a  few  typical  ones  can  be 
mentioned  here.  Paul  Samassa,  Der  Volkerstreit  im 
Habsburgerstaat  (Leipzig,  1910),  may  be  taken  as  repre- 
sentative of  the  German  of  the  German  Empire.  T. 
von  Sosnosky's  Die  Politik  im  Habsburgerreiche  (Berlin, 
1912-13,  2  vols.)  is  the  work  of  an  Austrophil,  as  is  also 
W.  von  Schierbrand's  Austria-Hungary:  The  Polyglot 
Emjdre  (New  York,  1917);  H.  W.  Steed's  The  Habsburg 
Monarchy  (London,  1914,  2d  ed.)  is  one  of  the  ablest 
surveys  in  the  English  language.  It  is  thoroughly 
worked  out  in  the  general  features,  but  slights  many  of 
the  national  and  provincial  aspects  of  the  Austrian 
question.  V.  Gayda's  La  crisi  di  un  impero  (2d  ed., 
1915),  English  ed..  Modern  Austria  (New  York,  1915) 
is  an  unusually  able  work  by  an  Italian  who  sees  clearly 
on  every  question  except  that  of  Italia  Irredenta.  A. 
Toynbee's  Nationality  and  the  War  (London,  1915)  is 
another  very  useful  summary  of  the  question.  The 
official  Austro-Hungarian  point  of  view  has  been  stated 
in  such  works,  among  many  others,  as  Ritter  von  Sax, 
Die  Wahrheit  iiber  die  serbische  Frage  und  das  Serbentum 
in  Bosnien  (Vienna,  1909) ;  L.  Mandl,  Oesterreich-Ungarn 
und  Serbien  (Vienna,  1911);  C.  M.  KnachtbuU-Huges- 
sen.   The  Political  Evolution  of  the  Hungarian  Nation 


108  APPENDIX  III 

(London,  1908,  2  vols.);  and  numerous  official  publica- 
tions and  dossiers. 

The  works  thus  far  mentioned  were  based  on  numer- 
ous studies  in  Slavic  and  other  languages,  only  a  few  of 
which  can  be  mentioned  here. 

For  the  Slovenes  one  will  look  into  Josef  Apih's 
Slovenci  in  18^8  leto  (Lublan,  1888) ;  Loncar's  Politidno 
zivljenje  Slovencev  (in  Bleiweis's  Zbornik.  Published  by 
the  Matica  Slovenska,  Lublan,  1909);  and  Vosnjak's 
Spomini  (Lublan,  1906,  2  vols.). 

The  following  will  be  found  useful  for  the  Croats: 
V.  Klaic,  Povjest  Hrvata  (Zagreb,  1899  ff.,  5  vols.); 
R.  Horvat,  Najnovije  doba  hrvatske  povjesti  (Zagreb, 
1906);  Milan  Marjanovic,  Hrvatski  pokret  (Dubrovnik, 
1903-04,  £  vols.);  L.  V.  Berezin,  Khorvatsiia,  Sla- 
voniia,  Dalmatnia  i  Voennaia  Granitsa  (St.  Petersburg, 
1879);  I.  Kulakovskii,  Illirizm  (Warsaw,  1894);  T. 
Smiciklas,  Hrvatska  narodna  ideja  (Rad  Jugo-Slavenski 
Akad,  Ixxx) ;  V.  Zagorsky,  Frangois  Racki  et  la  renais- 
sance scientifique  et  politique  de  la  Croatie  1828-1894- 
(Paris,  1909). 

For  the  Serbs,  a  few  of  the  fundamental  works  are: 
L.  KovaCevic  and  L.  Jovanovic,  Istorija  srpskoga  naroda 
(Belgrade,  1893-94,  2  vols.);  S.  Stanojevic,  Istorija 
srpskoga  naroda  (Belgrade,  1908);  J.  Ristic,  Diplomat- 
ska  istorija  srbije,  1875-1878  (Belgrade,  1896-98); 
V.  V.  Racic,  Le  royaume  de  Serbie.  Etude  d'histoire 
diplomatique  et  de  droit  international  (Paris,  1901); 
F.  P.  Kanitz,  Das  Konigreich  Serbien  und  das  Serbenvolk 
von  der  Romerzeit  bis  zur  Gegenwart  (Leipzig,  1904-09, 
2  vols.);  S.  GopCevic,  Geschichte  von  Montenegro  und 
Albanien  (Gotha,  1914);  F.  S.  Stevenson,  A  History  of 
Montenegro  (London,  1912).^ 

^  Lack  of  space  forbids  special  mention  of  works  by  such  scholars 
as  Loiseau,  Vellay,  Laveleye,  Hron,  Masaryk,  Spalajkovic,  Barre, 


APPENDIX  III  109 

There  is  a  good  survey  of  the  history  of  the  Jugo-Slavs 
in  Russian:  G.  irinskii,  Kratkfi  kurs  istofii  liizhnikh 
slavian  (Kharkov,  1909). 

Kallay,  Marczali,  Prezzolini,  Sokolovic,  Novakovi^,  Cheradame, 
Evans,  Erdeljanovic. 

The  Jugo-Slav  propaganda  societies  have  published  in  English: 
The  Southern  Slav  Appeal;  Jugo-Slav  Nationalism  by  B.  Vosnjak; 
The  Strategical  Significance  of  Serbia  by  N.  Zupanic;  The  Soutlicrn 
Slav  Programme;  A  Sketch  of  Southern  Slav  History;  Southern  Slav 
Culture;  Political  and  Social  Conditions  in  Slovene  Lands;  Avstro- 
Magyar  Judicial  Crimes  —  Persecutions  of  the  Jugo-Slavs.  In  French : 
Ceux  dont  on  ignore  le  martyre  {Les  Yougo-Slaves  et  la  guerre);  Les 
Yougo-Slaves  —  Lettr  union  7iationale;  Les  Slovenes  by  Q.  Krek;  and 
the  periodical  Bulletin  Vovgoslave. 

H.  Hinkovic  has  written  the  most  concise  statement  of  the  case  of 
the  Jugo-Slavs  in  The  Jugo-Slav  Problem.  Beprinted  from  the  World 
Court  Magazine  (1917). 


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